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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
It is a difficult and daunting task to try and trace back the actual origins of corporate 
governance, but what is clear is that it has been in existence for a very long time. It is made 
clear by some authors that corporate governance as a practice has been in existence since the 
16th and 17th centuries.1 The case was not always the same for every country as different 
countries have different points in history that sparked the actual practice of corporate 
governance. China’s corporate governance can be traced back to the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries. This is a period of interest for China because it was in this period that it began its 
industrialisation and in which it also attempted to transfer Western institutions into a non-
Western economy.2 In the United States (US) corporate governance was brought to the 
official reform agenda by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) in the mid-1970s and 
it was in this period that the term first appeared in the Federal Register, which is the official 
journal of the federal government.3 
At the core of every successful corporation, there is a dire need for good corporate 
governance practices be it for the purpose of attracting investors or the maximisation of 
profits. Corporate governance became an area of concern mainly in instances of economic 
crises, these include the Asian crisis of 1997-2000 which devastated some of the world’s 
most successful economies.4 The other global financial crisis that brought serious attention to 
the realm of corporate governance was that of 2007-2008. This crisis has been termed the 
most serious financial crisis since the great depression and most scholars implicate corporate 
governance as one of the main reasons for the crisis.5 This led to a huge increase in the 
importance of corporate governance and it also became an area of concern in African 
countries. 
Corporate governance has no definitive definition but it has been defined as the way in which 
companies are directed and controlled.6 The concept of governance is merely to summarise 
                                                          
1 Morck R & Steier L The Global History of Corporate Governance: An Introduction (2005) 11. 
2 Morck R & Steier L The Global History of Corporate Governance: An Introduction (2005) 9. 
3 Cheffins B The History of Corporate Governance (2012) 2. 
4 Singh A ‘Corporate Governance , Corporate Finance and Stock Markets in Emerging Countries’ (2003) 3 (1) 
Journal of Corporate Law Studies 41. 
5 Kumar J and Singh J ‘Global Financial Crisis: Corporate Governance Failures and Lessons’ (2013) 4 (1) 
Journal of Finance, Accounting and Management 22. 
6 Mongalo T ‘The emergence of corporate governance as a fundamental research topic in South Africa’ (2003)  
120 The South African Law Journal 173. 
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the means by which organisations conduct themselves.7 Other authors have further provided 
that corporate governance includes an environment of trust, ethics, moral values and 
confidence as a synergic effort of all constituent parts, that is, stakeholders including 
government, the general public, service providers, professionals, and the corporate sector.8 
The concept has also been defined as a set of processes, customs, values, codes, policies, law 
and structures governing the way a corporation is directed, controlled and held accountable.9 
The increased importance of corporate governance led to increased efforts worldwide to 
adopt measures that are in line with those implemented by developed economies. However, 
the same measures cannot be readily implemented in developing countries. 
In order to understand the origins of state-owned enterprises, it is important that one 
understands the history of the modern day corporation. Corporations are a product of a 
process that began in England as early as the 17th century. In the beginning, ownership was 
divided among a few individuals who often participated in management.10 At this time most 
businesses existed through partnerships which were basically the only form available for 
most types of businesses.11 Then one of the first corporations came into existence and this 
was the British East India Company at the end of 1600. It was a joint-stock company that was 
granted an English Royal Charter by Queen Elizabeth I with the intention of favouring trade 
privileges in India.12 During this period, corporations were quasi-governmental institutions 
that were chartered by the crown for specific purposes.13 
This marked the first time a corporation was formed as well as the gathering of investors in 
order to satisfy the extensive capital requirements of the operations. The state through the 
queen and kings in other countries closely monitored these corporations and would revoke 
the charters if they were not happy about the way they were being run.14 If one pays close 
attention, this period is also indicative of the early signs of state intervention in the running of 
                                                          
7 Maune A ‘Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe: An Overview of its Current State’ (2015) 5 (1) Asian 
Economic and Financial Review168. 
8 Crowther D and Seifi S Corporate Governance and International Business (2011) 11.  
9 Corporate Secretaries International Association ‘State-owned enterprises corporate governance framework 
needs to be enforced’ available at http://www.csiaorg.com/State-owned-enterprises-corporate-governance-
framework-needs-to-be-enforced (accessed 20 February 2015) . 
10 Braendle V and Kostyuk A Corporate Governance (2007) 3. 
11 Ekelund R and Tollison R ‘Mercantilist origins of the corporation’ (1980) 11 (2) The Bell Journal of 
Economics 716. 
12 Ekelund R and Tollison R ‘Mercantilist origins of the corporation’ (1980) 11 (2) The Bell Journal of 
Economics 715. 
13 Braendle V and Kostyuk A Corporate Governance (2007) 3. 
14 Braendle V and Kostyuk A Corporate Governance (2007) 3. 
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corporations. The king or queen granted charters for operation and they had to be satisfied 
that company objectives were being maintained for the company to remain operational. This 
suggests that the state was to an extent in control of these corporations even though they were 
mostly run by the funds of private individuals. This might have paved way for the modern 
day state-owned enterprise (SOE) that was championed by the government of Margret 
Thatcher centuries later.15 
For the purposes of this paper, state-owned enterprises are entities that are established by the 
central and local governments and whose supervisory officials are from the government.16 It 
has been noted that most African countries still have large numbers of state-owned 
enterprises operating in their economic sectors and these form an integral part of overall 
economic activity.17 In Zimbabwe there are 78 state-owned enterprises which operate in an 
array of economic sectors from energy, water and agriculture to transport.18 It is then very 
important that these enterprises always perform at their optimum levels as they are 
responsible for much of the well-being of the population since they are the biggest employers 
and service providers. 
Since the well-being of many African nations is to an extent dependant on proper 
performance of state-owned enterprises, it is crucial that they are managed well.19 It has been 
conceded that firms that have good corporate governance norms tend to perform better than 
those that do not.20 This means that the success of the enterprises will depend on the 
corporate governance mechanisms in place as well their implementation. The Zimbabwean 
government has in the past made efforts to ensure that sufficient corporate governance 
mechanisms are in place but these seem to not have been sufficient as evidenced by the large 
scale failures of state-owned enterprises.21 
                                                          
15 Megginson W and Netter J ‘From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization’ (2001) 
XXXIX Journal of Economic Literature 323. 
16 OECD Working Group on Privatisation and Corporate Governance of State Owned Assets- State owned 
enterprises in China: reviewing the evidence (2009) 5. 
17 Corrigan T Corporate Governance in Africa’s State-Owned Enterprises: perspectives on an Evolving System 
(2014) 1. 
18 Balbuena S State-owned enterprises in Southern Africa: A stock taking of reforms and challenges (2014) 49. 
19 Nunnenkemp P ‘State Enterprises in Developing Countries’ (1986) 21(4) Intereconomics 186. 
20 Todorovic I ‘Impact of Corporate Governance on Performance of Companies’ (2013) 9 (2) Montenegrin 
Journal of Economics 47. 
21 Corporate Secretaries International Association ‘State-owned enterprises corporate governance framework 
needs to be enforced’ available at http://www.csiaorg.com/State-owned-enterprises-corporate-governance-
framework-needs-to-be-enforced (accessed 20 February 2015). 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
In Zimbabwe corporate governance is generally regulated by the Companies Act,22 the 
Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Act23 and the listing requirements, but these are applicable only 
to listed companies, the Public Finance Management Act24 (PFMA) as well as other rules of 
professional bodies such as the Institute of Directors which are not mandatory in nature. The 
Corporate Governance and Remuneration Policy Framework for Chief Executive Officers of 
Parastatals, State Enterprises and Local Authorities was introduced in 2010 pursuant to 
corruption and unethical behaviour.25 The Institute of Directors Zimbabwe (IoDZ) has led 
efforts to introduce a corporate governance code for both the public and private sector in the 
form of the recently launched National Code on Corporate Governance Zimbabwe 
(ZIMCODE). Before the code was launched the private sector opted to follow the provisions 
of the King II Code of South Africa and those of the Cadbury Report of England but both of 
these were not uniformly applied.26 Some of the aspects highlighted in these codes may be of 
importance in state-owned enterprises as there is need to incorporate some of the principles. 
The abovementioned Acts and codes show efforts to regulate corporate entities, but the 
Zimbabwean corporate sphere has been muddled with scandals so that confidence in 
corporations, be it parastatals or private companies, has been lost by the general public. The 
most recent scandals include those of parastatal bosses mainly the Zimbabwe Broadcasting 
Corporation (ZBC), which is the country’s main broadcaster and that of Premier Service 
Medical Aid Society (PSMAS), which handles medical aid facilities for most civil servants.27 
It came to light that these persons had been ridiculously remunerating themselves while the 
majority of the employees where either not paid for months or were being paid negligible 
amounts of money.28 The PSMAS chief executive officer was earning a monthly salary of 
US$ 210 000 amounting to a total of US$ 500 000 allowances included.29 Meanwhile the 
whole board was taking about US$ 1.3 million in monthly salaries while the medical aid 
                                                          
22 Companies Act (Chapter 24:03). 
23 Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Act (Chapter 24:18). 
24 Public Finance Management Act (Chapter 22:19) 11 of 2009. 
25 Zvavahera P and Ndoda G ‘Corporate Governance and ethical behaviour: The case of the Zimbabwean 
Broadcasting Corporation’ (2014)  9 Journal of Academic and Business Ethics 3. 
26 Obert S, Suppiah SDK, Tendai MJ, Desderio CM and Martin D ‘Corporate board failure in Zimbabwe: Have 
non-executive directors gone to sleep?’ (2014) 16 IOSR Journal of Business and Management 78.  
27 Obert S et al ‘Corporate board failure in Zimbabwe: Have non-executive directors gone to sleep?’ (2014) 16 
IOSR Journal of Business and Management 78. 
28 Kajau S ‘Clean up the mess, restore sanity at PSMAS’ The Standard 15 December 2013 available at 
http://www.thestandard.co.zw/2013/12/15/clean-mess-restore-sanity-psmas/ (accessed 20 February 2015). 
29 Ncube F and Maunganidze L ‘Corporate Governance and executive Compensation in Zimbabwe State Owned 
Enterprises: A Case of Institutionalised Predation’ (2014) 4 (6) Management 134. 
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society owed US$ 3 million to service providers.30 In addition to this there has been media 
exposure of major corruption in public and private bodies, flouting of tender procedures and 
other undesirable activities.31 These and other scandals raised serious concern among other 
professionals which then led to the drafting of a corporate governance code by the IoDZ. 
The above mentioned corporate governance failures have reduced investor confidence in 
Zimbabwe and even the locals have lost faith in the system.32 It has been reported that 
between July 2011 and July 2013 a total of 711 companies had closed their doors and about 
300 were under judicial management.33 This situation becomes worse when these failures are 
in state-owned enterprises which are supposed to be the major players in the economy but 
they are always dependent on state funding because of inabilities in funding themselves.34 
According to a paper published in 2012 only one out of the six major state owned enterprises 
was performing well with the rest either in need of government funding or in a state of 
limbo.35 The failure of these enterprises has been due to poor economic planning and 
restructuring, but there also has been a good measure of bad corporate governance 
practices.36 
It is of great importance that when measures that have been implemented in one nation seem 
to be failing time be taken to look at other nations that have had a considerable amount of 
success in the same field. This study will examine how New Zealand has managed to create 
successful SOEs. Over the years, New Zealand has managed to implement measures that 
were aimed towards improving efficiency and governance, and increasing the 
competitiveness of its SOEs.37 Zimbabwe is very much in need of measures that are aimed 
towards the same goals. 
                                                          
30 Rusvingo S ‘The Salarygate Scandal in Zimbabwean Parastatals Sector: Another Darkside of the Nation’ 
(2014) 14 Global Journal of Management and Business Research -A: Administration and Management 20.  
31 Mugabe T ‘Zimbabwe: Code of corporate Governance Crafted’ The Herald 29 May 2014 available at 
http://www.herald.co.zw/code-of-corporate-governance-crafted/ (accessed 10 February 2015). 
32 Ncube F and Maunganidze L ‘Corporate Governance and executive Compensation in Zimbabwe State Owned 
Enterprises: A Case of Institutionalised Predation’ (2014) 4 (6) Management 131. 
33 Ncube F and Maunganidze L ‘Corporate Governance and executive Compensation in Zimbabwe State Owned 
Enterprises: A Case of Institutionalised Predation’ (2014) 4 (6) Management 131. 
34 Mambo E ‘State enterprises bleed to death’ Zimbabwe Independent 24 October 2014 available at  
http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2014/10/24/state-enterprises-bleed-death/ (accessed 11 March 2015) .  
35 Zhou G ‘Three Decades of Public Enterprise Restructuring in Zimbabwe a Will-Of-The-Wisp Chase? (2012) 
2 (20) International Journal of Humanities and Science 181.  
36 Zhou G ‘Three Decades of Public Enterprise Restructuring in Zimbabwe a Will-Of-The-Wisp Chase? (2012) 
2 (20) International Journal of Humanities and Science 182. 
37 Mulgan R Politics in New Zealand 3 ed (1997) 79. 
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New Zealand has been a member of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) since 1973.38 Its membership is of relevance for this study because the 
OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises will be used in this 
analysis and it is important to compare to a country that applies the guidelines.39 It is 
noteworthy that in 2010 New Zealand’s SOEs had a combined asset value of $ 53 billion and 
revenues of over $ 13 billion.40 This level of success makes an analysis of how this has been 
achieved imperative. According to Transparency International New Zealand’s public sector 
had the second lowest levels of corruption in 2014.41 The low levels of corruption can be 
attributed to government openness and effectiveness among other factors.42 
Before the New Zealand government formed the modern day SOE it owned a range of 
essential commercial trading activities such as coal mining, petrochemicals, banks and 
insurance companies.43 These were state run organisations that had boards of directors at their 
helm whose powers and functions could be reviewed by the responsible Minister.44 In 
essence, this meant that Ministers retained the authority to make decisions. The government 
owned commercial trading activities were responsible for the delivery of social and 
regulatory functions.45 
In the 1980s the New Zealand economy was underperforming and the treasury undertook an 
analysis into the root causes of the economic downturn.46 This analysis revealed that the 
ailing government commercial trading activities were contributing extensively to the 
economic downturn.47 The analysis proved that the entities were poorly governed, consumed 
                                                          
38 OECD ‘List of OECD member countries- Ratification of the Convention on the OECD’ available at 
http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/list-oecd-member-countries.htm (accessed 12 October 2015). 
39 Financial Markets Authority ‘Corporate Governance in New Zealand: Principles and Guidelines’ 2014.  
40 TEARA ‘Story: State-owned enterprises’ available at http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/state-owned-
enterprises/page-1 (accessed 13 October 2015). 
41 Transparency International ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2014: Results’ available at 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results (accessed 12 October 2015). 
42 Transparency International ‘What makes New Zealand, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and others ‘cleaner’ than 
most countries’ available at http://blog.transparency.org/2011/12/07/what-makes-new-zealand-denmark-
finland-sweden-and-others-%E2%80%9Ccleaner%E2%80%9D-than-most-countries/ (accessed 13 October 
2015). 
43 The Board Room Practice Limited ‘Corporate Governance in new Zealand Government-owned Companies: A 
Stock-Take’ (2005) 1. 
44 The Board Room Practice Limited ‘Corporate Governance in new Zealand Government-owned Companies: A 
Stock-Take’ (2005) 1. 
45 Luke B Strategic entrepreneurship in New Zealand’s state-owned enterprises: Underlying elements and 
financial implications (Unpublished PhD thesis, Auckland University of Technology, 2009) 64. 
46 New Zealand Treasury ‘State-owned Enterprises: History of Policy Development and Implementation’ (1996) 
6.  
47 New Zealand Treasury ‘State-owned Enterprises: History of Policy Development and Implementation’ (1996) 
8. 
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large amounts of capital and other resources and produced low to negative returns.48 At this 
time there was little or no mention of corporate governance as a field of enquiry despite the 
presence of government commercial trading activities.49  
In light of the above circumstances, the New Zealand treasury decided that the limited 
liability company would be the most effective form for the management of government 
commercial trading activities.50 This led to the corporatisation of various government 
departments that had a strong commercial function in an effort to steer them away from 
ministerial control and government interference.51 This marked the formation of the modern 
day SOE which was brought into existence by the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 and was 
to be governed by the Companies Act 1953 in an effort to emulate the private sector.52 The 
Companies Act would form a legal basis for managerial autonomy.53  
Under this regime the primary function of SOEs is to act as successful business enterprises 
that generate profits.54 Each SOE has two shares, one held by the Minister of SOEs and the 
other one is held by the Minister of Finance on behalf of the crown with the former being the 
executive shareholder for day-to-day overview.55 The Minister of SOEs formed two advisory 
groups in addition to the usual advice from the treasury. One was the SOE Unit which 
reported directly to the Minister as part of his office.56 The other was the SOE Steering 
Committee which was made up of highly skilled directors and it provided the Minister with 
informed advice on governance and board appointment issues.57 Currently New Zealand 
utilises a centralised ownership model in the form of the Crown Ownership Management 
                                                          
48 Mulgan R Politics in New Zealand 3 ed (1997) 79. 
49 The Board Room Practice Limited ‘Corporate Governance in new Zealand Government-owned Companies: A 
Stock-Take’ (2005) 2. 
50 The Board Room Practice Limited ‘Corporate Governance in new Zealand Government-owned Companies: A 
Stock-Take’ (2005) 2. 
51 Luke B Strategic entrepreneurship in New Zealand’s state-owned enterprises: Underlying elements and 
financial implications (Unpublished PhD thesis, Auckland University of Technology, 2009) 68. 
52 Mulgan R Politics in New Zealand 3 ed (1997) 80. 
53 New Zealand Treasury ‘State-owned Enterprises: History of Policy Development and Implementation’ (1996) 
18. 
54 Mulgan R Politics in New Zealand 3 ed (1997) 79. 
55 Luke B Strategic entrepreneurship in New Zealand’s state-owned enterprises: Underlying elements and 
financial implications (Unpublished PhD thesis, Auckland University of Technology, 2009) 74. 
56 The Board Room Practice Limited ‘Corporate Governance in new Zealand Government-owned Companies: A 
Stock-Take’ (2005) 3. 
57 New Zealand Treasury ‘State-owned Enterprises: History of Policy Development and Implementation’ (1996) 
78. 
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Unit which is an integral part of the treasury that brings together ownership monitoring, 
appointments and governance functions of SOEs.58 
New Zealand has moved towards very progressive SOE reforms that can provide valuable 
lessons for Zimbabwe. This paper will attempt to derive from these reforms and provide 
recommendations on the way forward for Zimbabwe. 
1.2 Research Questions 
Corporate governance failures have been rampant in Zimbabwe’s state owned enterprises and 
it is necessary to assess if the measures in place are adequate to address the situation at hand. 
In-order to respond to the above, this paper will explore answers to the following questions: 
 What is corporate governance and what is the importance of state owned enterprises? 
 What international best practices are available and is Zimbabwean legislation in 
tandem with them? 
 What has been done by other nations that faced the same predicament? 
 What measures can be adopted to improve the current situation? 
1.3 Significance of Study 
There has been a considerable amount of discussions on the state of corporate governance in 
Zimbabwe. The private sector has led efforts in conjunction with the government to address 
the problems that have been hanging over corporate governance mechanisms, therefore there 
is a need to assess if these efforts are fitting for the problem at hand. This paper will also shed 
light on the issue of political appointments and connections in SOE leadership which has 
largely contributed to the failures of these firms. The economic revival of the nation is 
dependent on proper corporate governance and this paper shall assess the strengths and 
weaknesses of the measures to be implemented and provide recommendations where 
possible. 
1.4 Methodology  
In assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the Zimbabwean corporate governance 
structure, the researcher shall mainly use primary and secondary sources. Primary and 
secondary sources such as legislation, journal articles, reports and newspaper articles shall be 
                                                          
58 OECD State-Owned Enterprises Governance Reform: An Inventory of Recent Change (2005) 17. 
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used. Comparative research will be made to the nation of New Zealand, which had to adopt 
measures that would create a conducive environment for SOEs to operate successfully. 
International and regional instruments that provide principles of good corporate governance 
for state-owned enterprises shall be used to establish international best practice. The 
methodology shall also include the use of internet sources.  
1.5 Chapter Structure 
Chapter 1 
This chapter gave an introduction of the topic, an overview of corporate governance concepts 
and a brief overview of SOEs and their importance. In this chapter, the background of the 
Zimbabwean corporate governance failures and New Zealand’s SOE reforms was also 
explained. 
Chapter 2 
This chapter begins by providing an in-depth discussion of how corporate governance 
developed, its definitions and some background into some of its theories. The chapter also 
provides a broad overview of SOEs, their functions as well as their contributions to 
development.  
Chapter 3 
This chapter focuses on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) Guidelines on Corporate Governance for State-owned Enterprises. These have 
significant relevance to non-OECD countries as they provide a yardstick in terms of 
successful SOE corporate governance. This is done in order to assess if Zimbabwe has 
adopted any of the guidelines which reflect international best practices. This chapter seeks to 
determine if the current legislative regime fully addresses the gaps that were apparent in 
corporate governance, this is done by assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the current 
regime against the abovementioned principles of the OECD. It also highlights the fact that 
one of the major concerns in SOE governance is that of political connections. Appointments 
have been linked to politics and this remains a major concern as ‘the powers that be’ have 
immense control of every aspect of government. 
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Chapter 4 
In this chapter there is a comparative analysis of New Zealand’s corporate governance 
reforms and structure to that of Zimbabwe. This country has experienced a considerable 
measure of failures in its government trading activities and these had a lot to do with the 
nations’ corporate governance mechanisms. New Zealand is a valuable comparator because 
its SOE reforms embody the OECD guidelines and its SOEs are now successful. 
Chapter 5 
This chapter gives a conclusion on the assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of 
Zimbabwe’s corporate governance structure. In this chapter, recommendations are also given 
on strengthening the corporate governance regime and the way forward. 
1.6 Conclusion 
It is important that when enterprises that are crucial to a country’s economy fail an 
assessment be made in order to establish the causes. In this case, an assessment of the 
governance framework will be made in order to establish whether it is adequate or not. There 
will also be a need to analyse what other nations have done in order to overcome the same 
obstacles and in this case New Zealand will be examined. 
The next chapter will discuss corporate governance and state-owned enterprises. This will 
provide insight on what corporate governance is and why there is a need to ensure that state-
owned enterprises are properly governed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 
2.1 Introduction to Corporate Governance and State-owned Enterprises 
The previous chapter highlighted that Zimbabwe has a large number of SOEs and for this 
reason it is very important that they are properly governed in order to ensure their 
profitability. This links to this chapter which will mainly emphasise on the importance of 
SOEs. The beginning of this chapter will broadly define corporate governance as well as 
provide insight on some of the theories of corporate governance. After that, the chapter will 
define SOEs and provide their history and the reasons for the formation. The chapter will also 
examine the contributions to the development of SOEs and provide an overview of the 
history and current state of SOEs in Zimbabwe. This will set the background for the chapters 
to follow as it will provide insight on the importance of SOEs in Zimbabwe.  
2.1.1 Rise to prominence of Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance has been in existence for a long time, but prior to the 1990s the term 
‘corporate governance’ was rarely used, before this the nature of corporate governance was 
somewhat different from what is known today.59 Therefore, there is no definitive historical 
treatment of corporate governance since the subject is immense.60 Some authors opine that 
corporate governance has been in existence since the time where there was a possibility of 
conflict between investors and managers.61  
Other authors have also stated that corporate governance has been in existence since the time 
of the formation of the East India Company, the Hudson’s Bay Company, the Levant 
Company and other major chartered companies that were formed in the 16th and 17th 
centuries.62 It can however be deduced that for most nations, more or less the same reasons 
exist for the rise to prominence of corporate governance. In France corporate governance was 
motivated by the implosion of the Mississippi Company in 1720 and in Germany it was 
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partially motivated by the need to protect small shareholders and the public from self-serving 
insiders.63 
Numerous authors differ on this subject, but what is clear is that corporate governance has 
been in existence for a long time, even at times when the term was not in much use. There are 
also different interpretations of the term, but there is some consensus as to what corporate 
governance actually concerns and this will be covered in the definitions section of the 
chapter. 
2.1.2 Evolution of the concept of Corporate Governance 
The concept of corporate governance was widely adopted in different parts of the world, but 
with major variations because of the different circumstances in each economy.64 As a result, 
different corporate governance frameworks were developed. In the development of this 
concept, two main approaches of corporate governance that are differentiated by the legal 
system at work in each country can be identified.65 
In civil law jurisdictions such as France, Germany and Italy corporate governance was 
developed in a manner that was focused on stakeholders.66 For these countries corporate 
governance was to balance the interests of a number of key groups such as managers, 
employees, creditors, suppliers, customers and the community at large. The approach 
followed by these countries is known as the insider model of corporate control as it 
recognises that the greatest control in a firm is held by those that are close to the day to day 
activities of the firm.67 
In common law jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and the USA corporate governance 
development was shareholder orientated.68 This meant that corporations were supposed to 
achieve the objectives that were set by their owners and management could be held 
                                                          
63 Morck R and Steier L The Global History of Corporate Governance: An Introduction (2005) 11, 13. 
64 Mulili B and Wong P ‘Corporate Governance Practices in Developing Countries: The case of Kenya’ (2011) 2 
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65 Mulili B and Wong P ‘Corporate Governance Practices in Developing Countries: The case of Kenya’ (2011) 2 
(1) International Journal of Business Administration 15. 
66 Bruner C Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World: The Political Foundations of Shareholder 
Power (2013) 7. 
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responsible for attaining the firm’s goals.69 This approach, known as the outsider model of 
corporate control recognises the gap between management and the shareholders of a firm.70  
As economies progressed it was later on realised that the outsider model of corporate control 
was not sustainable in the modern world. This led to the gradual acceptance of the fact that 
corporations are viewed as a nexus of contracts with their stakeholders.71 Society and 
government create an environment in which corporations can fulfil their social responsibility 
and tax obligations.72 
2.1.3 Definitions of Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance has been defined as “the process of supervision and control intended to 
ensure that the company’s management acts in accordance with the interests of 
shareholders.”73 This definition was given support by institutional investors and they are in 
agreement with the narrow interpretation of corporate governance which concerns itself 
mainly with the rights of shareholders, without much regard for those of other parties. 
Another author opined that in corporate governance “the governance role is not concerned 
with the running of the business of the company per se, but with giving overall direction to 
the enterprise, overseeing and controlling the executive actions of management and with 
satisfying legitimate expectations of accountability and regulations by interests beyond the 
corporate boundaries.”74 This definition is much broader than the one above as it includes the 
aspect of accountability to interests beyond the corporate boundaries and these are other 
stakeholders.  
In addition to the above definitions is another that states that “…the governance of an 
enterprise is the sum of those activities that make up the internal regulation of the business in 
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compliance with the obligations placed on the firm by legislation, ownership and control. It 
incorporates trusteeship of assets, their management and their deployment.”75  
There is contrast between the narrow and broad definitions of corporate governance as their 
focus areas tend to differ. The narrow definition, as mentioned above, concerns itself with the 
rights of shareholders whereas the broad definitions take into account all stakeholders76 such 
as managers, employees, creditors, suppliers and the greater community.77 The broadest of 
definitions consider that companies are accountable to the whole of society, future 
generations and the natural world.78 These definitions are connected to the models of 
corporate governance mentioned above.79 The narrow definition describes the insider model 
while the broad definition describes the outsider model. In cases where SOEs are concerned it 
will be important that the stakeholder approach be given preference as these companies 
should be of service to the general public. 
Corporate Governance has also been defined as a set of processes, customs, values, codes, 
policies, law and structures governing the way a corporation is directed, controlled and held 
accountable.80 A definition that would be favourable for SOEs provides that corporate 
governance is defined as “the system of checks and balances, both internal and external to 
companies, which ensures that companies discharge their accountability to all their 
stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their business activity.”81 For 
the purposes of SOEs parties such as employees, managers, creditors, suppliers and the 
society at large should be considered stakeholders. The inclusion of these parties is in line 
with the definition of a stakeholder which provides that stakeholders are “those groups who 
affect and/or are affected by the organisation and its activities.”82 
2.1.4 Theories of Corporate Governance 
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80 Corporate Secretaries International Association ‘State-owned enterprises corporate governance framework 
needs to be enforced’ available at http://www.csiaorg.com/State-owned-enterprises-corporate-governance-
framework-needs-to-be-enforced (accessed 20 February 2015). 
81 Solomon J Corporate Governance and Accountability 2 ed (2007) 14. 
82 Mook L ‘Integrating and Reporting an Organisation’s Economic, Social and Environmental Performance. The 
Expanded Value Added Statement’ in Schaltegger S, Bennett M and Burritt R (eds) Sustainability Accounting 
and Reporting (2006) 284. 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
In order for one to fully understand the concept of corporate governance, it is also necessary 
that they understand the different theories. This section will provide insight on some but not 
all of the theories, that may have relevance to SOEs. 
2.1.4.1 The Agency Theory 
In this theory, managers of the company are defined as ‘agents’ and the shareholder as the 
‘principal’, in a relationship where the shareholder delegates day to day decision making in 
the company to directors who are the agents.83 The agency theory leads to the need to 
harmonise the interests of managers and shareholders for the objective of company value to 
be achieved.84 The firm is not a natural person but a legal fiction, where individual interests 
are brought into symmetry within a framework of contractual obligations.85 These contractual 
relationships are not only with employees but with other parties such as suppliers, creditors 
and customers.86 
The major problem of this system is that, the agents do not always make decisions that are in 
the best interests of the principal as there is an assumption that their goals differ.87 This 
results from the fact that there might be a large number of shareholders and complex 
operations and the management which has the expertise to run the company increasingly 
gains effective control and this puts them in a position where they are bound to pursue their 
own agendas.88 One author stated that it cannot be expected that those who manage other 
people’s money will treat the money as their own and that waste and negligence are always 
present, more or less, in every business.89  
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It is for the above reasons that it has been suggested that it is necessary to implement 
measures to monitor managers, even though some of them might be costly. A direct way of 
monitoring that is not costly is shareholder participation in voting.90 
This theory focuses on shareholders and managers only and this is not ideal in SOEs, where 
focus should be on all stakeholders. It recognises that managers are accountable mainly to 
shareholders, which will not be true for a SOE, which would have an array of stakeholders. 
Another questionable aspect of this theory is the persons to whom directors owe a duty to, 
directors should owe their duties to the company and not a select party.91 This is in line with 
the shareholder primacy model and will mean that the employees, environment and the 
community at large will suffer, which makes this theory ineffective for SOE governance.92 
2.1.4.2 The Stewardship Theory 
This theory assumes that managers are faithful, responsive and effective people and therefore, 
they are good administrators of company resources.93 Managers and executives are the 
stewards working for the shareholders that protect and make profits for the shareholders.94 
The behaviour of the steward is organisational and has higher utility than individualistic self-
serving behaviour and it will not depart from the interests of the organisation because the 
steward is focused on its goals.95 According to this theory, where shareholder wealth is 
maximised, the steward’s utilities are maximised too because organisational success will 
serve most requirements and stewards will have a clear mission.96 The premise of this theory 
is that managers are faithful and effective, and when they do their best to secure profits for 
shareholders the company will run efficiently.  
This theory is almost the opposite of the agency theory in that the agency theory suggests that 
managers or employees can be self-interested whereas, the stewardship theory assumes that 
managers will be faithful and are good administrators. The stewardship theory suggests the 
                                                          
90 Solomon J Corporate Governance and Accountability 2 ed (2007) 18. 
91 Cahn A and Donald D Comparative Company Law: Text and Cases on the Laws Governing Corporations in 
Germany, the UK and the USA (2010) 337. 
92 Cahn A and Donald D Comparative Company Law: Text and Cases on the Laws Governing Corporations in 
Germany, the UK and the USA (2010) 337.  
93 Nicolae B and Violeta A ‘Theories of Corporate Governance’ 23 (1) (2013) Studia Universitatis “Vasile 
Goldis” Arad Economics Series 120. 
94 Abdullah H and Valentine B ‘Fundamental and Ethics Theories of Corporate Governance’ (2009) 4 Middle 
Eastern Finance and Economics 90. 
95 Yusoff W and Alhaji I ‘Insight of Corporate Governance Theories’ 1 (1) (2012) Journal of Business and 
Management 57. 
96 Yusoff W and Alhaji I ‘Insight of Corporate Governance Theories’ 1 (1) (2012) Journal of Business and 
Management 57, 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
unifying of the positions of Chairman and CEO so as to reduce agency costs and have greater 
role as stewards in the firm.97 In modern day corporate governance this has been discouraged 
and more so in SOEs that have been performing badly due to the conduct of those in control. 
This is contrary to the governance objectives in SOEs, especially on the African continent 
where corruption is rife. It would also be naive to assume that managers are faithful and not 
self-serving in a country like Zimbabwe, where personal greed has become a common trend. 
2.1.4.3 The Stakeholder Theory 
The stakeholder theory has developed gradually from the 1970s. Its first exposition was a 
general theory of the firm that incorporated corporate accountability to a wide range of 
stakeholders.98 This theory has probably received the most attention in recent times as the 
role of the company came under scrutiny and revision. A stakeholder can be defined as any 
person or group which can affect or be affected by the actions of a business.99 This includes 
employees, suppliers, creditors and the wider community and competitors. The stakeholder 
theory is concerned with values and beliefs about the appropriate relationship between the 
individual, the enterprise and the state.100 
It has been argued that this theory focuses on managerial decision making and the interests of 
all stakeholders have inherent value and that there is no set of interests that is superior.101 It is 
unlike the agency theory in which managers are working and serving the shareholders. In this 
they serve a network of relationships that is more important than the owner-manager-
employee relationship.102 This theory of corporate governance, which is based on satisfying 
the interests of all stakeholders has proved the most efficient in history, because it does not 
only work to achieve financial gain, but also to achieve a competitive advantage due to gain 
in people’s trust and consequently goodwill on the market.103 
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The theory was proposed by Edward Freeman, who recognised it as an important element of 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), a concept which recognises the various 
responsibilities of corporations today.104 CSR can be defined as actions that appear to further 
the social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required by law.105 This 
means that a firm will be going beyond what is required by law and making efforts for the 
benefit of the stakeholders. This is very important in SOEs for there is a dire need that they 
are able to adhere to this theory of corporate governance, which will benefit all stakeholders 
especially the general public which has been subject to neglect.  
2.1.4.4 The Political Theory 
Political theory brings the approach of developing support from shareholders, rather than by 
simply purchasing voting power or control.106 This theory recognises that the allocation of 
corporate power, privileges and profits between owners and other stakeholders is determined 
by how governments favour their constituencies.107 The political model of corporate 
governance can have a vast influence on governance developments.108 The political influence 
is evidenced by the participation of governments in the capital of companies or laws adopted 
by political structures which have a noteworthy influence on corporate governance.109 
This theory recognises the influence that political powers have on corporate governance and 
this has some relevance to SOEs as the mechanisms that will potentially be employed will 
have a connection to the political model. 
For the purposes of this paper, the stakeholder theory will be followed. This theory is relevant 
to SOEs because it encompasses aspects that fit within some of the reasons for the formation 
of these enterprises. In particular, it has relevance where an SOE is formed to fulfil a specific 
social objective which is the case in most African countries. The objectives may include 
correcting economic imbalances and providing employment. Since the stakeholder theory 
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considers the interests of all stakeholders, it is very important that SOEs have the same focus 
as they are run by the state on behalf of the society. This theory will provide a fitting 
benchmark on which to assess the adequacy of the governance framework.  
2.2 Understanding State-Owned Enterprises and their Contributions to Development 
2.2.1 Defining State-Owned Enterprises 
The understanding of SOEs is important for this paper because there is a need to highlight the 
magnitude of their involvement and contribution to a typical developing country’s economy. 
From the definition in the last chapter, SOEs can be defined as entities that are established by 
the central and local governments and whose supervisory officials are from the 
government.110 The World Bank has defined state-owned enterprises as ‘government-owned 
or government-controlled economic entities that generate the bulk of their revenue from 
selling goods and services.111 State-owned enterprises are also referred to as government 
corporations, public enterprises, or public sector enterprises which are a diverse mix ranging 
from internationally competitive listed companies, large-scale public service providers, 
wholly owned manufacturing and financial firms, to small and medium enterprises.112 
2.2.2 History and the Rationale/Functions of SOEs 
Direct state intervention in the economy increased strongly in the 20th century as result of the 
Great Depression and other financial crises, the Second World War and its associated 
destruction of industry and infrastructure, and the break-up of colonial empires.113 State 
intervention had however been present from ancient times that can be traced as far back as 
the times of the Roman Republic in which the state and private individuals and companies 
fulfilled almost all of the state’s economic requirements.114 In ancient Greece, the 
government owned the land, forests and mines but it contracted work to individuals and 
firms.115 These are some of the origins of state ownership and the practice has been carried 
out throughout history by different governments and is still prevalent in the lesser developed 
nations with developed nations applying it at a smaller scale but with considerable success.  
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Later on, post war reconstruction in Europe and Japan was influential in direct government 
involvement in economic activities, and therefore to nationalise or establish companies 
placed in the strategic sectors such as energy, transport and banking.116 After years of debate 
on how deeply the state should be involved in regulating economic activity, it was the 
government of Margaret Thatcher (1979) that provided an answer to this question.117 This 
government conceded that the state should at least own telecommunications and postal 
services, electric and gas utilities, and most forms of non-road transportation especially 
airlines and railroads.118 This led to the growth of state ownership in the developed world and 
this spread to their former colonies in Africa, Asia and Latin America. 
In most Southern African countries, SOEs have been in existence from periods dating back to 
the attainment of independence. The business sectors in these countries consist mainly of 
resource based activities such as farming and fishing.119 Several reasons have been advanced 
over the years that justify the use of SOEs despite this being a declining trend in the more 
advanced nations. The rationale for SOEs is mixed in a variety of social, economic and 
political objectives.120 One of the reasons advanced is the need to counter monopolistic 
powers in many sectors and the need to ensure that prices are not above the price of 
producing the output.121 This comes from the premise that private monopolists may produce 
and price at levels that are not socially optimal.122 Some countries find monopolies desirable 
in industries that may have substantial economies of scale, in which optimal efficiency is 
achieved when the output is produced and supplied by a single monopolistic producer.123 In 
such cases a certain type of monopoly, be it legal or natural may make state ownership the 
most efficient solution.124   
State ownership can be a means to promote the development of economically desirable 
industries but that which may not be developed through private investment.125 This occurs in 
instances where there might not be enough incentives for the private sector to engage in a 
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certain industry but development of that industry may very well be of importance to a nation. 
This industry might have important spill overs within or across sectors and for this reason the 
state will invest in it.126 For this reason, it is often argued that many successful private sector 
firms in the developed world owe their success, in part, to prior state ownership.127 This 
argument links the presence of SOEs to development and suggests that there is a need for 
state ownership at different stages of the economy.128 
In developing countries, SOEs are assigned or created to fulfil specific social objectives 
which have their roots in the periods of colonisation.129 This will include correcting regional 
and economic imbalances, providing employment and reducing the concentration of 
monopoly power in the economy. This argument is put forth by the ‘commanding heights’ 
rationale and it further states that as a pre-requisite for balanced growth, there must be state 
control of the key sectors of the economy.130   
SOEs are also being relied on as a remedy to market failures and to remove obstacles to 
development.131 This is mainly done in countries with weaker regulatory frameworks or 
where the outsourcing of state activities to the private sector is difficult.132 Additionally in 
instances where operations of SOEs have important ramifications for other parts of the 
economy, this may influence toward its privatisation.133 Such societal obligations could be 
codified and imposed on a private buyer, but in a changing environment it is impossible to 
predict every future event and this has been used by some governments as an argument to 
maintain state control over facilities such as airports and airlines.134  
SOEs can also be used as a means to achieve stability in countries that may have been subject 
to conflict. This has relevance in instances where the SOEs are microcosms of the societal 
and economic problems that led to the conflict and it must be noted that the struggle to 
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control them can serve to sustain the original conflict.135 For this outcome to be avoided, 
campaign and development plans must address SOE issues decisively, comprehensively, and 
pragmatically.136 A good example of this is the nation of Liberia in which the United Nations 
security forces took steps to enable the state-owned electric power company and state 
managed rubber plantations to serve as the basis for political stability.137 
The other motivation for SOEs is the issue of externalities. These are the outcomes (positive 
or negative) of an economic activity that affects other members of a community.138 Negative 
externalities are particularly concerning since, being produced by only one or a group of 
economic actors, they imply a cost for others which is higher than the private cost and a 
typical example of this is pollution, private cost might even be higher than the collective one 
(positive externality).139 In these cases of market failure, the private sector is encouraged to 
overproduce goods that generate negative externalities and to under-produce those that 
generate positive externalities.140   
Another reason for which SOEs can be established is for industrial and financial bailouts that 
result from irreversible crises. This was evident during the global financial crisis of 2008 in 
which Ireland had to nationalise most of its domestic banking sector. These measures were 
deemed necessary in order to rescue the ailing domestic banks.141 
2.2.3 Contributions to Development  
It is important to understand the contributions of SOEs to the development of nations, 
especially those that are still developing as this will highlight the need for proper corporate 
governance in these institutions. It has been reported that SOEs account for 20 per cent of 
global investment and 5 per cent of employment.142 Furthermore, SOEs in Africa produce 15 
per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), in Asia 8 per cent and Latin America 6 per cent, 
in Central and Eastern Europe the state sector also accounts for 20 to 40 per cent of overall 
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output.143 These figures represent the significant contribution to development and the well-
being of SOEs in different parts of the world, proving that there still is a need to focus on the 
corporate governance of these enterprises. 
Presently, some state-owned enterprises are among the largest and fastest expanding 
multinational companies. A study conducted in 2011 shows that more than 20 per cent of the 
world’s largest firms are state-owned (204 firms) and that they come from 37 different 
countries and their joint sales amounted to 3.6 trillion dollars in 2011.144 This represented 
more than 10 per cent of the combined sales of the whole Forbes Global 2000 and is 
equivalent to 10 per cent of the world’s GDP thus exceeding GDPs of countries such as 
Germany, France and the UK.145  
It has been further recorded that SOEs in OECD countries have for some time represented a 
substantial part of the GDP, employment and market capitalisation, these entities have been 
prevalent in key sectors of the economy such as energy, transport and telecommunications.146 
There are a number of very successful SOEs such as the award winning Singapore Airlines, 
Brazil’s EMBAER, the French Renault, Korean POSCO and the highly respected Indian 
Bombay Transport Authority.147 In many parts of Africa infrastructural services are mainly 
handled by SOEs with some assistance from the private sector.  
2.2.4 History/Overview of SOEs in Zimbabwe 
When Zimbabwe attained independence, the country had about twenty SOEs that were spread 
across different key sectors of the economy. These SOEs included the Rhodesia Iron and 
Steel Company, the Grain Marketing Board, Rhodesia Railway Lines, the Agricultural 
Marketing Board, Rhodesia Airlines and the Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation.148 Before 
independence this public enterprise infrastructure was a means of fortifying the colonial 
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settler regime and a buffer against the threatening international environment during the period 
of international sanctions.149 Upon attaining independence, the country instituted a range of 
political measures aimed at reconfiguring and refocusing the operational thrust of the public 
enterprise sector and this involved amending enabling Acts, creating new parastatals in 
neglected sectors and putting in place direct state control on enterprise pricing, investment, 
borrowing and marketing.150 
Like many other African states, Zimbabwe faced difficulties in running these enterprises 
from the 80s through the 90s. The state as the owner implemented policies that were 
somewhat politically and socially favourable but not economically sustainable, for example it 
pushed for the Grain Marketing Board to pay producers more than its export price, while the 
price at which the GMB imported was higher than the price at which it sold to millers.151 The 
widespread failure of state-owned enterprises the world over during this period also led to 
some domestic and external pressure on the Zimbabwean government to privatise or 
commercialise the enterprises.152 External pressure mainly came from International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) which argued that the management, performance and orientation of the 
enterprises ranged from mediocre to poor.153 These forces also regarded it as ideologically 
imperative that state economic control through these enterprises should be reduced, if not 
eliminated, to make way for the unhindered operation of market forces.154 
The hardships and pressure in the late 80s and early 90s led to the adoption of the enterprise 
reforms in 1991, in the form of the Framework for Economic Reform (1991). These reforms 
were aimed at reducing the level of subsidies which had become unsustainable and to correct 
the nations’ budget deficits. The reforms were also aimed at the commercialisation and 
privatisation of the state’s assets but there was public doubt in regards to transparency in the 
disposal process.155 In regards to governance, the reforms also envisaged the relaxation of 
direct control of the operations by government, thus giving more autonomy to the boards and 
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management.156 With the implementation of reforms that ranged from cutting direct and 
indirect subsidies, which were in the form of import duty exemptions, concessionary loans 
and government guarantees on commercial bank loans, the performance of the enterprises 
deteriorated significantly in the reform period.157 
The 1990s did not see much success in the enterprise reform process and various arguments 
were advanced as to the actual causes of this and from these it can be deduced that improper 
corporate governance practices have always been a factor in the demise of these enterprises. 
It was pointed out that one of the reasons for failure in these enterprises was the lack of 
autonomy and accountability of the boards and managers. Instead, there was widespread 
involvement of the line ministries in the day-to-day decision-making, particularly in decisions 
affecting personnel and salaries, investment and purchasing.158 From the onset one should 
note that in Zimbabwe and in Africa generally, the political imperatives of the leaders have 
often prevented the adoption, let alone the implementation of comprehensive public sector 
reforms.159  
One of the first major scandals involving SOEs was that of the Willowvale Motor Industry in 
the year 1988. It was found that a number of government ministers had been given preference 
in the purchase of vehicles from the motor company which they would then resell at inflated 
prices.160 In some of the instances, one individual acquired a vehicle for Z $ 22 000 and then 
resold it for Z $ 65 000 and another purchased one for Z $ 24 000 and resold it for Z $ 
80 000.161 This was an outright abuse of office shown by these individuals as they all used 
their political might to acquire these vehicles. What is alarming is that after an enquiry was 
conducted most of these individuals received presidential pardon.162 Years later the same 
individuals implicated in this were now heading some of the country’s parastatals such as 
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Zimbabwe Newspapers and Air Zimbabwe.163 This is a trend common in the country of 
recycling the same individuals over and over to head the ailing enterprises that are left and 
this evidences bad governance practices. 
These trends did not change much throughout the years and the management of these 
enterprises fell under the same predicaments as it had in the past, such as the lack of 
autonomy and accountability of the boards and managers. The efforts to implement measures 
that would govern these enterprises were futile as they were hardly ever implemented. Fast-
forward to the years 2013-2014 and the manifestations of non-implementation of governance 
measures took a new turn. State-owned enterprises became famous for their mismanagement 
and the ridiculous compensation methods for their top level managers and CEOs as well as an 
array of corrupt activities. This led to wide scale exposure of the corrupt activities as well as 
suspensions of enterprise boards and CEOs and this had not been done in a while.164 
In 2014 numerous scandals were exposed in regards to compensation of the heads of 
parastatals in Zimbabwe. One the first major cases was that of the ZBC CEO, who was 
receiving an amount of US $ 40 000 a month and on top of this he had been involved in other 
corrupt activities. In the same year the ZBC CEO was involved in a US $ 1 million scandal, 
in this it was alleged that he had inflated figures of a contract for the purchase of a radio 
Outside Broadcasting van worth US $ 100 000 to $ 1 050 000 in alleged connivance with 
another company, this was done without the approval of the board.165 The CEO of the 
company was only authorised to approve purchases not exceeding $ 50 000 and the board 
could only approve purchases of up to $ 300 000, with any purchase above that requiring the 
approval of the State Procurement Board.166 
Followed by this was the exposure of the CEO of PSMAS who was earning an outstanding 
US $ 210 000 in salary and another US $ 260 000 in allowances, with the whole board taking 
US $ 1.3 million a month in salaries at a time when the majority of employees were not paid 
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for months.167 At this time, the civil servant medical aid society owed about US $ 3 million to 
service providers and this resulted in denial of treatment for civil servants in some 
instances.168 Despite this lack of ethical conduct, the PSMAS CEO continued to serve on 
numerous other boards some of which would point to his connectedness to those in higher 
offices, such as the presidency of the Zimbabwe Football Association (ZIFA). 
These events partly show what has become of enterprise governance in Zimbabwe and they 
confirm that corruption has become a norm in the nation. There is need to restore proper 
corporate governance in an effort to turn around the economic collapse which has only 
benefited a handful. 
2.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has given the background of the origins of corporate governance and it 
highlighted that the subject is immense. It has no definitive time of origin in history but what 
is clear is that it is an important practice and it has been in use for a very long time despite the 
late emergence of the terminology. 
The chapter also focused on a select number of corporate governance theories. In particular 
the stakeholder theory which is the most suitable for SOEs. This is because the theory is 
inclusive of all parties that can affect or be affected by the activities of the company. In 
Zimbabwe SOEs are generally understood to be a means to address a number of social issues 
such as unemployment and economic inequality. This means that the theory will be the most 
suitable in testing the adequacy of the corporate governance framework. 
The contributions to the development of SOEs were also mentioned in this chapter. 
Zimbabwe has 78 SOEs most of which are underperforming or not functional at all. These 
enterprises could be making substantial contributions to the ailing economy. It is clear that 
dysfunctionality in most of the SOEs can be attributed to bad governance practices, which is 
puzzling considering the economic situation. For this reason it is important that a framework 
that seeks to preserve the few functioning SOEs be implemented and encouraged.  
The next chapter will examine the OCED Guidelines on Corporate Governance for State-
owned Enterprises. The chapter will assess the corporate governance framework of 
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Zimbabwe against the principles that are given in the guidelines. It will briefly highlight that 
some of the problems that have tainted SOEs in recent years might be beyond what can be 
solved by an effective regulatory framework. 
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CHAPTER 3 
3.1 INTORDUCTION TO THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC 
COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD) AND ZIMBABWEAN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 
The previous chapter illustrated that SOEs are still an important part of some economies and 
it is imperative that proper corporate governance mechanisms be in place to ensure their 
profitability. This chapter will focus on the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for 
State-owned Enterprises. These will be used as a yardstick to test the adequacy of the 
corporate governance framework of Zimbabwe. The chapter will also infuse the stakeholder 
theory and the definition of corporate governance referred to in the previous chapter into the 
evaluation.  
3.1.1 What is the OECD?  
The OECD is an organisation that seeks to promote policies that will improve the economic 
and social well-being of people around the world.169 It does this by engaging different issues 
affecting the economies of member countries as well as conducting studies on member and 
non-member countries. More importantly, the OECD has been instrumental in addressing 
corporate governance issues. It started by publishing general Principles of Corporate 
Governance that have gained considerable attention because these managed to provide a 
benchmark that a lot of countries can relate to. The OECD Principles are actively used by 
governments, regulators, investors, corporations and stakeholders in both OECD and non-
OECD countries. The principles have been adopted by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) as 
one of the Twelve Key Standards for Sound Financial Systems and they form the basis for the 
corporate governance component of the Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes of 
the World Bank Group.170 
Upon realising the continued importance of SOEs, the OECD published the Guidelines on 
Corporate Governance for State-owned Enterprises.171 Many economies had been struggling 
with the governance of state-owned enterprises. These guidelines were the first of their kind 
and for this reason they attracted global interest from a variety of stakeholders. The aspects 
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touched on in these guidelines are not limited to member countries but apply to any economy 
that operates these enterprises. The relevance of these principles lies in the fact that the 
experiences of economic transition and financial crises in developing and emerging market 
economies have confirmed that a weak corporate governance framework is incompatible with 
sustainable financial market development and growth.172 
It is for the above reasons that the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-
owned Enterprises are the most relevant for the purposes of this study. They provide a 
benchmark that can be used by any economy and they have been referred to by most 
governments in their quest to accomplish proper SOE governance. It should be noted that 
since Zimbabwe is not a member of the OECD these are only guidelines even to member 
countries, but these can also be followed by non-members. In the global economy, it is of 
great importance that international best practices are adhered to as participation is usually 
dependant on how well these are applied. It has been shown that SOEs generally perform 
better when they apply the best practices of the OECD, and this implies that the OECD 
guidelines would be useful for Zimbabwe’s SOEs.173 The guidelines are continually being 
revised to meet the needs of the changing times and economies.  
3.1.2 OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for State-owned Enterprises 
State-owned enterprises have remained very relevant in some parts of the world and despite 
their decline in developed economies, the OECD published the OECD Guidelines on 
Corporate Governance for State-owned Enterprises. These guidelines are based on and are 
fully compatible with the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance but focus on issues 
that are specific to the corporate governance of SOEs.174 The guidelines were originally 
published in 1999, revised in 2004 and then the guidelines were adopted by the OECD in 
2005.175 After a decade the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned 
Enterprises were updated.176 These provide a benchmark as to what measures may be 
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implemented in state-owned enterprises in order to achieve a system of governance that is 
robust enough to ensure a properly governed enterprise.177 The guidelines are broken down 
into various headings which will be summarised in this section of the paper. These headings 
address the major aspects of governing state-owned enterprises with that of the state’s role as 
an owner possibly the most crucial specifically for a nation like Zimbabwe where this is one 
of the most problematic issues. 
3.1.3 Rationales for state ownership 
The guidelines provide that the state exercises the ownership of SOEs in the interest of the 
general public.178 It is further provided that the ultimate purpose of state ownership of 
enterprises should be to maximise value for society through an efficient allocation of 
resources.179 The government should also develop an ownership policy which will define the 
rationales for state ownership, the state’s role in the governance of SOEs and how the state 
will implement its ownership policy.180  
The ownership policy should be subject to appropriate procedures for political accountability 
and should be disclosed to the public.181 Multiple and contradictory rationales for state 
ownership can lead to either a very passive conduct of ownership functions, or conversely 
result in the state’s excessive intervention in matters or decisions which should be left to the 
enterprise and its governance organs.182 In regards to a clear ownership policy it has been put 
forward that Zimbabwe does not have a clear ownership policy which results in complexity 
of the ownership structure.183 The complex structure renders SOEs vulnerable to be used to 
achieve short term goals at the expense of efficiency.184  
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The guidelines also stress the need for public consultation when the state is developing and 
updating the ownership policy.185 Various measures are provided which include consultation 
with the general public and its representatives and more importantly, consultation with 
private sector representatives, including investors and market service providers, and trade 
union representatives.186 
3.1.4 The State’s role as an owner 
Under this, the state should act as an informed and active owner and establish a clear and 
consistent policy, ensuring that the governance of SOEs is carried out in a transparent and 
accountable manner, with the necessary degree of professionalism and effectiveness.187 Here 
the government will have to ensure that aspects such as remuneration, audits, board 
nominations and monitoring systems are adequately implemented and effective. It is 
important for the government to keep away from the day to day management of SOEs and 
allow them full operational autonomy.188 The state should also let SOE boards exercise their 
responsibilities and should respect their independence.189  
The guidelines also provide that governments should simplify and standardise legal forms 
under which SOEs operate.190 This should be done because SOEs may have different legal 
forms from other companies. This may reflect specific objectives and or societal 
considerations as well as special protection granted to certain stakeholders.191 It is important 
for governments to base themselves in corporate law that is applicable to private companies 
and avoid creating a legal form or granting SOEs a privileged status or special protection 
when this is not necessary for the achievement of public policy objectives.192 
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The exercise of the ownership right should be centralised in a single ownership entity or 
carried out by a co-ordinating body.193 This helps in clarifying the ownership policy and its 
orientation and it also helps ensure its consistent implementation.194 The ownership entity 
should be held accountable to the relevant representative bodies and have clearly defined 
relationships with relevant public bodies such as the state supreme audit institutions.195 
In regards to the above, it is clear that the government of Zimbabwe has not entirely followed 
this principle since there has been government intervention in day to day operations of most 
SOEs. This is the case in SOEs such as Air Zimbabwe, which in 2012 had a debt of about 
US$ 140 million, but had recently acquired two new airplanes that were almost the same 
value of the debt, without any explanation as to how this occurred and in Zimbabwe this 
usually points to political interference.196  
3.1.5 State-owned enterprises in the marketplace 
The legal and regulatory framework of SOEs should ensure a level playing field and fair 
competition in the marketplace when SOEs undertake economic activities.197 There should be 
a clear separation between the state’s ownership function and other functions that may 
influence conditions for SOEs particularly the regulatory function.198 It is also provided that 
stakeholders and other interested parties including creditors and competitors should have 
access to efficient redress through unbiased legal or arbitration processes when their rights 
have been violated.199 SOEs undertaking economic activities should not be exempt from the 
application of general laws, tax codes and regulations.200 Where SOEs combine economic 
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activities and public policy objectives high standards of transparency and disclosure 
regarding their cost and revenue structures must be maintained.201  
3.1.6 Equitable treatment of shareholders and other investors 
Where SOEs are listed or include non-state investors among its owners, the state and the 
enterprises must recognise the rights of all shareholders and in accordance with the principles 
of the OECD must ensure equitable treatment and access to corporate information.202 This 
principle enunciates a very important principle of governance in any corporation, it is 
important that minority shareholders perceive their treatment as equal to or as important as 
that of the major shareholder. This is so because the relationship between the state as 
controlling shareholder and the minority shareholders is particularly delicate, especially in 
commercial companies which are listed.203 The state, as a dominant shareholder may be in a 
position to abuse minority shareholders as it is able to make decisions at the annual general 
meetings without the approval of the minority shareholders.204 Apart from being in a position 
to control the board’s composition, the state may also pursue political or policy objectives, 
which if implemented, may be at the cost of the minority shareholders.205  
To guard against the abovementioned incidents, SOEs should observe a high degree of 
transparency and should also develop an active policy of communication and consultation 
with all shareholders.206 Participation of minority shareholders in general meetings should be 
facilitated in order to allow them to take part in important decisions such as board election.207 
The guidelines also provide that national corporate governance codes should be adhered to by 
all listed and, where practical, unlisted SOEs.208 
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3.1.7 Stakeholder relations and responsible business 
Stakeholders are central to the overall operations of any business and it is important that 
relations with the various stakeholders are maintained. The term stakeholder refers to 
individuals or groups that can affect or are affected by a corporation’s activities and these 
include investors, employees, customers, suppliers and communities.209 The stakeholder 
strategy is based on the notion that companies and society are interdependent, therefore, 
company success is connected to the well-being of local and global communities and all of a 
company’s other stakeholders.210 The principle provides that, the state ownership policy 
should fully recognise the enterprises’ responsibility towards stakeholders and that it requires 
the enterprises to report on their relations with stakeholders.211 The ownership policy should 
also make clear any expectations the state has in respect of responsible business conduct by 
SOEs.212 
In any company stakeholders are diverse, for SOEs these may include the general public or a 
particular part of the public depending on the objectives of the enterprise. These relations 
may then be critical for those SOEs that are involved in the fulfilment of general service 
obligations or those whose activities may be vital for the economic development of the 
communities in which they operate.213 In other cases, stakeholders may not have a direct 
relationship with the company, but it will still be important that the company takes heed of 
the rights of such groups.  
Research has shown that stakeholders are not fully involved in corporate governance issues in 
Zimbabwe. In a working paper by McGee it was shown that there is no stakeholder 
involvement in corporate governance but it does not provide any recommendations as to how 
this should be remedied.214 It also does not examine the corporate governance instruments in 
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Zimbabwe but instead it uses descriptive information obtained from the World Bank on the 
state of corporate governance in Zimbabwe.215 
The implementation of this guideline in Zimbabwe has been at an all-time low and employees 
who are arguably the most important stakeholders have been in bad relations with some of 
the SOEs. It has become very common that employees are either not paid in full, not paid at 
all or are sent on unpaid leave as was the case at the Grain Marketing Board (GMB).216 It was 
reported in 2014 that a total of 3 600 GMB employees were ordered to go on compulsory two 
weeks leave each month as the company struggled with finances.217 The GMB had not paid 
its employees in four months and it owed US$ 37 million to farmers who had delivered grain 
in the 2013/14 season.218 The farmers and employees are both important stakeholders and 
non-payment of the monies due to them is a sign of failed relations, with these parties 
disgruntled proper functioning of the enterprise may have been jeopardised. 
More importantly the guidelines state that SOEs must not be used as vehicles for financing 
political activities and that they should not make political campaign contributions.219 This is a 
prevalent practice in Zimbabwe as SOEs are known to fund political campaigns and trips 
abroad for those in government.220 More recently the struggling SOEs were ordered to pay 
between US$ 35 000 and US$ 120 000 in contributions to the first lady’s birthday fundraising 
dinner.221 Such activities will not end anytime soon if the current government is in power and 
this leaves the future uncertain for SOEs. 
3.1.8 Disclosure and Transparency 
It is important that state-owned enterprises observe high standards of transparency. This is 
usually in regards to information on company financials and other pertinent issues. SOEs 
should observe high standards of transparency and be subject to the same high quality 
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accounting, disclosure, compliance and auditing standards as listed companies.222 SOEs must 
observe these standards in disclosing material and non-material information in areas of 
significant concern to the state as an owner and the general public.223 The information that 
should be disclosed includes (a) a clear statement to the public of enterprise objectives and 
their fulfilment, (b) enterprise financial and operating results, (c) the remuneration of board 
members and key executives and (d) board member qualifications, selection process, roles on 
other company boards and whether they are considered as independent by the SOE board.224 
SOEs should also provide information on key issues relevant to employees and other 
stakeholders that may materially affect the financial and non-financial performance of the 
enterprise or have significant impacts on the stakeholders.225 Financial statements of SOEs 
must also be subject to an independent external audit that is based on high standards.226 The 
ownership entity should also make use of web-based communications to develop and publish 
annually an aggregate report on SOEs.227 
Zimbabwe has managed to maintain a moderate level of disclosure in terms of auditing, the 
Comptroller and Auditor-General’s offices have managed to produce annual reports that have 
revealed gross public finance maladministration.228 However, it has been argued that the 
legislation that enables the functions of the Comptroller and Auditor-General did not give 
power to the office of the Comptroller and Auditor-General to compel Ministers and 
departments to observe and comply with the treasury instructions.229 This has resulted in 
delayed submissions and in other instances total failure by ministries to produce certain 
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returns and statements required for the audit.230 Published reports reflected a uniformity of 
audit observations that rose from year to year, which meant that little or no actions followed 
on observations and recommendations made.231 
3.1.9 The Responsibilities of the Boards of State-Owned Enterprises  
The board of directors of a company can be defined as a group of persons elected by the 
shareholders of a company to govern the affairs of the company.232 In state-owned enterprises 
these individuals are usually appointed by the state and there is an expectation that they will 
act in good faith and in the best interests of the company. The guidelines provide that the 
boards of SOEs “should have the necessary authority, competencies and objectivity to carry 
out their function and monitoring of management.233 They should act with integrity and be 
held accountable for their actions.”234  
The boards should carry out their functions subject to the objectives set by the government 
and the ownership entity and they should have the power to appoint a Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO).235 They should also be composed in a manner that allows them objective 
independent judgement and there should be separation of the roles of Chairman and CEO.236 
One important aspect of any SOE board is that it retains autonomy over any decisions that are 
within its scope, as this will prevent political interference and for this reason it is important 
that SOE boards are nominated through a transparent process. SOE boards should also be 
able to set up specialised committees that support the board in performing its functions in 
areas such as auditing, remuneration and risk management.237  
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Irresponsible boards have plagued Zimbabwean SOEs for a considerable amount of time and 
this has immensely contributed to the large scale failures that have been seen over the years. 
In 2014 it was revealed that in most SOEs there were obscene salaries, corruption, tender 
manipulation and general mismanagement that was aided and abetted by insufficient 
oversight.238 This resulted in the firing of the boards of the ZBC, ZMDC, MMCZ and 
Marange Resource Boards, Air Zimbabwe and Zinara among others.239 The parastatal board 
system in the country is known to be driven by cronyism and patronage and members of the 
public have lost faith in the system altogether.240 This points to the fact that SOE boards have 
been highly dysfunctional and this is not in tandem with the abovementioned principle of 
corporate governance.  
If the guidelines are followed, they would provide for a good model of corporate governance 
for Zimbabwe. The next part of this chapter will examine the main pieces of legislation that 
govern corporate governance in SOEs in Zimbabwe and attempt to evaluate their adherence 
to the OECD guidelines. 
3.2 An Overview of the Corporate Governance Framework of Zimbabwe 
Companies are generally formed through two major avenues in Zimbabwe. The first is 
through the Companies Act (Chapter 24:18) which provides the ways in which a company 
may be registered. The commanding provision is section 7 which gives right to any persons 
to subscribe their names to a memorandum of association for the purpose of forming an 
incorporated company.241 The second avenue in which companies are formed is through 
separate Acts. This mainly includes companies that are formed through Acts of parliament, 
which are the subject of this research, namely State-owned Enterprises. These entities are 
brought into being by Acts such as the Broadcasting Services Act (Chapter 12:06) which is 
the enabling Act for the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation. Other companies are also 
formed through conduct as outlined in the Companies Act. Section 4 provides that the Act 
applies to every company which shall be deemed to be duly incorporated and registered under 
the Act.242 This means that any company to which the Act is applicable, but was not officially 
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registered as such will be regarded as registered and incorporated under the Act, and this is 
usually owing to the manner in which it operates.  
In Zimbabwe corporate governance is regulated by the Companies Act,243 the Zimbabwe 
Stock Exchange Act244 and the listing requirements but these are applicable to listed 
companies. In the public sector corporate governance is regulated by the Public Finance 
Management Act (PFMA),245 the Corporate Governance and Remuneration Policy 
Framework for Chief Executive Officers of Parastatals, State Enterprises and Local 
Authorities (Corporate Governance and Remuneration Policy Framework) and the recently 
launched National Code on Corporate Governance Zimbabwe (ZIMCODE) which applies to 
both the public and private sectors. State enterprises are further regulated by their enabling 
Acts such as the Air Zimbabwe Corporation Act246 and the Broadcasting Services Act.247 
This section of the work will evaluate the Acts and codes that are most relevant to corporate 
governance in SOEs. 
3.2.1 The Companies Act 
The Zimbabwean Companies Act forms the basic foundation for the formation, registration 
and management of companies. The Act regulates most of the activities of companies that are 
incorporated under it from the conduct of directors to issues of shares. One can conclude that 
the Act includes aspects of corporate governance as it regulates the conduct of directors and 
matters of accounts and audit even though the term corporate governance is not specifically 
referred to. It is however important to note that the Act is mainly applicable to companies that 
are incorporated under the Act as stipulated in section 4 (1).248  
The government managed to commercialise and privatise some of the old parastatals and 
these became subject to the Companies Act and are also governed by strict rules of the 
Zimbabwe Stock Exchange.249 This study will not focus on these companies but on those in 
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which the government retained 100 per cent ownership.250 These are the state-owned 
enterprises brought into existence by enabling Acts of parliament and their regulation of 
operations is outlined in these Acts. These are the enterprises in which most of the problems 
discussed in this paper have transpired. 
3.2.2 The Public Finance Management Act 
According to the Act its purpose is to secure transparency, accountability and sound 
management of the revenues, expenditure, assets and liabilities of entities that are specified in 
section 4 (1).251 Section 4 then provides that the Act shall apply to ministries, designated 
corporate bodies and public entities, constitutional entities and statutory funds.252 State-
owned enterprises fall under corporate bodies and public entities. The Act defines a public 
entity as any corporate body that is established by or in terms of any Act for special purposes, 
a company in which the state has a controlling interest by virtue of shares or by right of 
appointment of members to the controlling body, a local authority and any partnership or 
joint venture between the state and any person which is prescribed by the Minister.253  
In regards to corporate governance the Act merely states that all public entities must adhere 
to and implement sound principles of corporate governance procedures, policies and 
practices.254 This was perhaps done in order to leave space for corporate governance specific 
codes such as the Corporate Governance and Remuneration Policy Framework for Chief 
Executive Officers of Parastatals, State Enterprises and Local Authorities. In this respect it is 
not possible to measure it against most of the core corporate governance guidelines of the 
OECD. It is however necessary that its accounting, reporting and disclosure procedures be 
examined in order to determine if they are effective enough for SOEs in Zimbabwe.  
The Act provides for the formation of accounting authorities for public entities, which may 
be the board of the said entity and where there is no board the CEO or the person in charge of 
the entity, or a person so appointed by the Treasury.255 Section 42 lays out the fiduciary 
duties of the accounting authority which include exercising utmost care to ensure reasonable 
protection of the assets and records for the public entity and the disclosure of material facts to 
                                                          
250 The Herald ‘Editorial Comment: Proposed ZIMCODE Bill Progressive’ The Herald 20 June 2014 available 
at http://www.herald.co.zw/editorial-comment-proposed-zimcode-bill-progressive/ (accessed 16 September 
2015). 
251 Section 3 Public Finance Management Act (Chapter 22:19). 
252 Section 4 (1) (a)-(d) Public Finance Management Act (Chapter 22:19). 
253 Section 2 Public Finance Management Act (Chapter 22:19). 
254 Section 50 Public Finance Management Act (Chapter 22:19). 
255 Section 41 (1)-(3) Public Finance Management Act (Chapter 22:19). 
 
 
 
 
51 
 
the Minister that may influence his decisions.256 The most important being the duty to “act 
with fidelity, honesty, integrity and in the best interests of the public entity in managing the 
affairs of the public entity.”257 This is in line with the OECD guidelines which require board 
members to act in the best interest of the company258 and it particularly applies where the 
accounting authority is the board. This part of the Act functions well when there is an 
accounting authority that is honest and has integrity. This has, however proved not to be the 
case in some of the SOE boards in Zimbabwe.  
The Act goes further by placing a duty on regular employees to ensure effective, efficient, 
economical and transparent use of financial and other resources.259 It is then alarming that the 
authority and persons entrusted with the protection of the assets of the entity are the same 
ones that grab the very same assets for themselves. This was made clear by the cases of 
boards of SOEs such as the ZBC and PSMAS that approved hefty salaries for board members 
and management that were even above private sector rates.260 In this case, the legislation has 
a commendable clear and straightforward intent, but this was defeated by the accounting 
authorities themselves. It is clear that what is needed in such situations is more rigorous 
screening procedures for persons who will sit on these boards as well involvement of public 
interest groups.  
One of the key issues that the Act seeks to tackle is that of conflict of interest. Section 42 (3) 
(a) of the PFMA stipulates that all accounting authorities (the board or other controlling body 
or the chief executive) have a fiduciary duty to “disclose to the other members of the 
accounting authority any direct or indirect personal or private business interests that the 
member or any spouse, partner or close family relation may have in any matter before the 
accounting authority.”261 The intent of this provision is clearly to avoid instances where 
members of the board or their close connections engage in business activities with a public 
entity for their own benefit.  
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Normally the board of directors should not be in the business of micro-managing the 
corporation that they serve.262 The board provides direction in the form of directives and it is 
the duty of the management to ensure proper management of the corporation.263 This possibly 
means that it is not every transaction that an enterprise engages in that receives the full 
attention of the board. The PFMA in its provision that requires disclosure of any instances of 
conflict of interest specifically mentions that these should be matters that come before the 
accounting authority.264 It can be argued that this provision is not sufficient for it only refers 
to matters that are before the accounting authority and not all dealings with the enterprise. 
Perhaps the wording could have been ‘any dealings with the state enterprise or parastatal.’ In 
as much as this may present a cumbersome exercise it is necessary for Zimbabwean SOEs 
because of the level that corruption and mismanagement have reached.   
The above wording would provide a more rigorous disclosure requirement as there have been 
strong tendencies in management and boards alike to engage in activities that benefited them 
or their close associates.265 The situation was escalated by the fact that there was also a 
culture of fear in the manner in which some state enterprises were being run. The state 
managed to appoint former army generals to the boards of SOEs such as the National 
Railways of Zimbabwe, Grain Marketing Board, Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe and 
Zimpapers.266 This has been referred to by some authors as the ‘militarisation’ of SOEs 
which has greatly contributed to the rot in these enterprises.267 This results in the boards 
being run by individuals of considerable power and it is never in the best interests of any 
board member to disagree with such members and that is if they are not in cahoots with the 
same individuals.  
In terms of the transparency and disclosure guideline of the OECD, the Act does provide for 
somewhat adequate accounting measures for there is emphasis on using standards that are 
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generally acceptable as well as transparency in all matters of accounting.268 However, there 
have been numerous cases of late and in some cases, total failure of disclosure of returns and 
statements required for audits by the Comptroller and Auditor-General.269 The Comptroller 
and Auditor General is responsible for auditing government ministries and state enterprises 
with powers enabled by the Audit Office Act (Chapter 22:18). The Audit Office Act works 
hand in hand with the PFMA. The Audit Office has been unable in certain instances to 
produce annual reports and meet statutory deadlines for parliament because the legislation 
that enables it does not provide for powers to compel Ministers and government departments 
to comply with treasury instructions.270 
There is a need to ensure that all the legislation on accounting and reporting has adequate 
measures to enforce the contained provisions. The disclosure requirements can also be 
tweaked to bring them in line with the standards of the OECD as this will bring much needed 
transparency. 
3.2.3 The Corporate Governance and Remuneration Policy Framework for Chief 
Executive Officers of Parastatals, State Enterprises and Local Authorities 
The Corporate Governance and Remuneration Policy Framework for Chief Executive 
Officers of Parastatals, State Enterprises and Local Authorities (Corporate Governance and 
Remuneration Policy Framework) was introduced in 2014 in order to tackle the rot in state 
enterprises. This framework, particularly addresses three main issues which are board 
appointments, management and performance; CEO appointment and performance and 
measures to deal with complex issues of salaries, allowances and procurement practices of 
public enterprises and local authorities.271 Since the framework has a narrow scope, it will 
only be possible to evaluate it against a select number of the OECD guidelines. The 
framework was introduced amidst public disclosures of the salary gate scandal. It is, however 
alarming that until 2014 the government had seen no need to introduce such measures to curb 
excesses that it clearly was aware of as these parastatals report to line ministries. 
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The OECD guidelines discussed above highlight the need for a competent board and it also 
provides the responsibilities of such boards.272 The framework provides that board members 
must be selected on grounds of merit, based on a clearly defined capability matrix and skills 
mix, in areas such as legal, finance, marketing, audit, technical, human resources, strategic 
and economic planning.273 The board members must also be inducted and trained by the 
Corporate Governance and Delivery Agency, which agency will be established within the 
office of the President and Cabinet to coordinate and monitor compliance with the 
ZIMCODE.274 This is commendable because if followed in practice it will make way for 
people who are adequately qualified to sit on SOE boards, which is also in line with the 
OECD guidelines.  
The Corporate Governance and Remuneration Policy Framework also provides for 
performance contracts for CEOs and other senior management.275 These contracts are 
important because the OCED guidelines indicate that there is a link between performance and 
remuneration.276 It is however not clear if these contracts apply to all members of the board. 
In addition to performance contracts, there is also provision for the evaluation of the 
performance of the CEO on a quarterly basis by the board and the communication of the 
results to the line Minister.277 The framework also provides for the establishment of board 
committees such as those on audit, finance, human resources and remuneration and this is in 
line with the OCED guidelines.278  
As stated in the OECD guidelines, the framework allows for the board of directors to be 
involved in the process of appointing a CEO.279 According to the framework the board 
conducts interviews with the assistance of professional human resource consultants and select 
three possible candidates which will be selected from by the Minister and approved by the 
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President.280 The framework is however not clear in terms of the boards’ role in the dismissal 
of the CEO. It only states that if CEOs do not meet the minimum requirements of their 
performance contracts this will constitute grounds for termination of office.281 
The framework goes further by stating that a 50:50 gender representation and regional spread 
should be factored into the selection criteria of board members.282 In essence, this seeks to 
address a social issue of gender representation in high profile positions in the nation and this 
is in line with some of the reasons for the formation of SOEs mentioned in the previous 
chapter. This is in line with the OECD guidelines since they provide that it is considered 
good practice to strive towards diversity in board composition, including with regards to 
gender, age, geographical, professional and educational background.283 
In as much as the framework has commendable provisions one main issue is seemingly not 
addressed. This is the issue of board independence, the OCED guidelines provide that it is 
important that SOEs have strong boards that can act in the interest of the company and 
effectively monitor management without undue political interference.284 One cannot 
emphasise enough the importance of board independence in SOEs especially in a country 
such as Zimbabwe where political interference is the order of the day.285 In a paper by the 
United Nations it was highlighted that political governance standards may spill over into the 
area of commerce.286 It is a matter of concern that the framework only prohibits Permanent 
Secretaries from being members of the board as this should also extend to Ministers and other 
government officials.287 The framework provides for multiple reporting mechanisms to the 
line Ministers but does not provide for any provision restraining the Minister from interfering 
with the activities of the board. 
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According to the framework, most decisions of the board and the CEO must be 
communicated either to the Minister or the Permanent Secretary. It further provides that line 
Ministers can appoint members from their ministries to sit through board deliberations and 
report to the ministry.288 This can be taken as the state exercising its ownership function and 
ensuring that the operations of the board are in line with its mandate. However, if the same 
framework does not guarantee independence of the board and CEO to at least carry out their 
duties without undue political interference, this could be a cause for concern. It is necessary 
for board independence to be promoted in all SOEs through measures that allow boards 
sufficient autonomy. 
3.2.4 The National Code on Corporate Governance Zimbabwe (ZIMCODE) 
The ZIMCODE was introduced this year (2015) as the first code of corporate governance of 
its kind in Zimbabwe. The National Code of Corporate Governance applies to both the public 
and private sectors. The ZIMCODE has taken the ‘apply or explain’ approach which means 
that it is voluntary, but it recommends that the Corporate Governance and Remuneration 
Policy Framework should be enacted into law so as to make it compulsory.289 The code has 
not seen much implementation yet, especially in the case of SOEs, but it is expected to be 
fully implemented in due course.290  
The code has been divided into different chapters, each containing several principles and this 
section of the work will go through each chapter. Since this is a holistic corporate governance 
code its principles will be evaluated against most of the OECD Guidelines on Corporate 
Governance of State-Owned Enterprises. The ZIMCODE will also be evaluated against the 
definition of corporate governance considered the most relevant for SOEs in this study and 
the stakeholder theory of corporate governance. 
3.2.4.1 Ownership and Control 
Under this chapter, the ZIMCODE provides for the rights of different classes of shareholders 
and it states that there must be a balance of power between the shareholders who provide 
capital, the managers and the board of directors.291 It is provided further that corporate power 
should not be concentrated in one person or a small group of persons because this will have a 
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negative impact on effective and ethical corporate leadership.292 Additionally, it states that 
corporate power which is represented by the right to vote on a one share one vote basis must 
always be aligned with economic rights.293 The ZIMCODE recommends that the right to vote 
should be extended to all shareholders, rights of minority shareholders must be respected and 
that there must be timely and transparent disclosure of annual reports.294 
Most of this chapter addresses an array of shareholder issues from ownership, voting rights, 
information given to shareholders and shareholder meetings, and this is adequately done. This 
aligns the chapter with the OECD guideline on equitable treatment of shareholders as it 
manages to cover most of the shareholder issues especially the rights of minority 
shareholders. A notable aspect of this chapter is the statement that “the community in which a 
company operates should benefit from its operations.”295 This alludes to the stakeholder 
theory of corporate governance, which is very important for Zimbabwe but this will be fully 
addressed in the following sections of this chapter. 
3.2.4.2 Boards of Directors and Directors 
The preamble of this chapter provides that a company acts through natural persons, mainly 
the board of directors, which is the governing and controlling body of the company. 
Therefore the board of directors must possess certain qualities, play certain roles and perform 
certain functions and duties.296 The principles state that the board of directors should provide 
effective corporate and entrepreneurial leadership.297 The principles further provide that the 
leadership of the board must be based on:  
(a) ethics, profession and good morality; 
(b) the notion that strategy, risk, performance and sustainability are inseparable; 
(c) prudent and effective controls which make it possible for risk to be assessed and 
managed properly; 
(d) complete compliance with, and respect for, applicable laws, especially the Bill of 
Rights as set out in the Constitution and adherence to non-binding rules, codes and 
best practice standards; and 
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(e) the recognition that the best interests of the company and the stakeholders must 
always be promoted.298 
The above principles encapsulate the duties and responsibilities of the board of directors and 
they provide a suitable yardstick for how directors should conduct themselves. They also seek 
to address to the issue of inadequately qualified executives who lacked good ethics who had 
been sitting on numerous boards.299 There is also need to change the general public 
perception that all SOE boards are riddled with corruption, mismanagement and fraud.300 The 
ZIMCODE also places on directors the legal duties of good faith, loyalty, care, skill and 
diligence in the discharge of their duties.301 Apart from these duties directors are also 
implored to act with honesty and integrity, and there is a duty to act morally that is 
supplemented by an array of recommendations.302 The moral duty is very important for 
Zimbabwean SOEs because it was clearly lacking among some of the boards such as those of 
the ZBC and PSMAS.303  
The chapter further provides for the qualities, membership criteria and qualifications of board 
members. The principle states that the board should be composed of members with good 
leadership qualities and core competencies required by the company such as accounting, legal 
and managerial experience.304 In terms of the composition of the board, it is provided that 
company boards should have a majority of non-executive directors, the majority of whom 
should be independent.305 It is also stated that the independent non-executive director must be 
independent in character and judgment and should not have relationships or circumstances 
which are likely to affect, or appear to affect their independence.306 
This chapter is very much in tandem with the OECD guideline on the responsibilities of the 
boards. In addressing the issue of board independence, it however does not specifically refer 
to the issue of political interference in the boards of SOEs. It manages to ensure the 
appointment of individuals who are independent in character and judgment but there still is 
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need to insulate SOEs from undue influence of the state. The chapter is also not clear on 
whether or not state officials are allowed to sit on SOE boards apart from the Permanent 
Secretaries that are precluded from sitting on boards by the Corporate Governance and 
Remuneration Policy Framework. Such a measure would be important to prevent instances of 
the so called ‘militarisation’ referred to above.307 
3.2.4.3 The Governance of Risk  
The code provides that business leaders should understand risk and how it can be measured, 
eliminated or mitigated and that risk management systems must be independently assured.308 
The code implores directors to establish an efficient and effective system for the day to day 
supervisions of the company’s financial and business operations.309 In addition to this there 
are numerous other measures that are alluded to in the code that include risk assessment, 
internal and external audits, audit committees and whistle blower policies. These allude to the 
OECD guideline on transparency and disclosure. This chapter is commendable because of the 
whistle blower policy for it allows individuals who are aware of the misuse of funds to report 
anonymously to an independent and trusted whistle-blowing system.310 This policy is also 
encouraged in the OECD guidelines under the stakeholder relations and responsible business 
guideline.311 
3.2.4.4 Information Management and Disclosure 
The preamble of this chapter explicitly states that disclosure of all company information and 
its accessibility to all stakeholders is crucial to the culture of building confidence, 
accountability and trust within the company.312 It goes further to state that the disclosure of 
information is important for stakeholders for it assists them in making informed decisions.313 
The inclusion of stakeholders is a step towards fulfilling the stakeholder theory of corporate 
governance that was alluded to in the previous chapter and this is a laudable effort. 
The principles in this chapter make room for information management and disclosure and 
they provide that the board should ensure that information is properly managed and is made 
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available timeously.314 The chapter contains multiple disclosure principles and 
recommendations that seek to address disclosure deficiencies highlighted above in the section 
on the Public Finance Management Act.315 Since this is a corporate governance code it is not 
in its scope to provide measures that compel Ministers and government departments to 
produce information needed for audits by the Comptroller and Auditor General. This means 
that the disclosure principles and recommendations available do not carry enough legislative 
might to ensure or compel the disclosure of such information. 
Chapter 5 recommends that the company’s remuneration policy and directors’ remuneration, 
including salary, benefits, bonuses, stock options and pensions should be included in the 
information disclosed by the company. This is a bold move, especially in regards to SOEs 
where boards have been ridiculously remunerating themselves at the expense of all other 
stakeholders.316 This would in turn promote the principle of transparency and disclosure as 
per the OECD guidelines. The chapter also makes provisions for integrated and sustainability 
reporting. It provides that integrated reporting includes the company’s strategy, governance, 
financial performance, and future outlook in one report.317 It states that the integrated report 
should be guided by the Global Reporting Initiative’s Integrated Reporting Council and any 
other reputable international reporting framework.318 
As far as corporate governance can go this chapter provides adequate disclosure measures 
that are in line with the OECD guideline on transparency and disclosure. It is important that 
these measures are followed since the legislation does not provide the power to compel the 
disclosure of  audit information.319 
3.2.4.5 Corporate Conflict Prevention and Resolution 
This chapter seeks to address the issue of conflict prevention and resolution since conflicts 
are inherent in business.320 As stated in the code, the prevention and resolution of corporate 
conflict makes it possible to protect the rights of shareholders and to protect the property and 
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business reputation of the company.321 The chapter makes provisions for the establishment of 
a corporate conflict resolution (CCR) committee by the board in order to deal with and 
prevent conflict.322 This measure complements the OECD guidelines for they provide that 
mechanisms should be implemented to avoid conflicts of interest.323 
This chapter also implores directors and employees not to use their positions for an improper 
purpose or take advantage of company opportunities to further their own interests.324 There is 
recommendation against one person taking the position of chairperson of the board and CEO 
as supervising oneself is a typical conflict of interest.325 Notably the chapter recommends that 
the remuneration committee should be fully composed of non-executive directors and that 
they should not determine their own remuneration but this must be done by an independent 
company.326 
3.2.4.6 Compliance and Enforcement 
This chapter explains the reason behind adopting the ‘apply or explain’ approach which is 
that the approach “…reflects an appreciation of the fact that it is often not a case of whether 
to comply or not, but rather a case of considering how the principles of a code and 
recommendations contained in it can be applied in the particular circumstances of a given 
enterprise.”327 This approach allows boards upon concluding that a recommendation is not in 
the best interests of a company the opportunity to apply the provision differently or apply 
another practice and still achieve the same objectives.328  
There is acknowledgement that the ‘apply or explain’ approach has a bias towards indirect 
coercion.329 The code then relies on disclosure principles to encourage compliance through 
linkage with membership to sector associations, professional bodies and to support the legal 
license to remain in business.330 Voluntary codes rely on the market as a mechanism for 
encouraging compliance and the codes provide a major source of corporate governance in 
addition to the law. It is the norm that corporate governance codes are voluntary in the private 
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sector. However there is need for a mandatory comprehensive code of corporate governance 
for SOEs as stated in this code that the Corporate Governance and Remuneration Policy 
Framework should be enacted into law. Incorporation of some on the major principles in the 
ZIMCODE should precede the enactment of the Corporate Governance and Remuneration 
Policy Framework.  
3.2.4.7 Governance of Stakeholder Relations 
This is one major aspect that had not been entirely addressed in the past by existing 
legislation as indicated above.331 In the governance of a company it is important to create a 
balance between the maximisation of shareholder value and the protection and promotion of 
the interests of other stakeholders.332 For the purposes of this paper stakeholders have been 
defined as “those groups who affect and/or are affected by the organisation and its 
activities.”333 In the ZIMCODE stakeholders are defined as parties that can or are affected by 
the operations of a company which is in line with the aforementioned definition.334 The code 
provides that stakeholders include shareholders, institutional investors, creditors, lenders, 
suppliers, customers, regulators, employees, trade unions, the media, analysts, consumers, 
society in general, communities, auditors and potential investors.335 
The principles of the code are set on the identification, recognition, respect and promotion of 
the legitimate rights of stakeholders by the company in its endeavours.336 It provides for 
mechanisms for engagement and transparency between the company and its stakeholders. 
The principles and recommendations in this chapter are consistent with the OECD guidelines 
which state that there should be recognition of the enterprises’ responsibility towards 
stakeholders and that it requires the enterprises to report on their relations with 
stakeholders.337 The code does indeed provide that companies must report on their relations 
with stakeholders through its integrated report.338 This will enable any interested parties to 
track the stakeholder relations of each company and this brings a new dimension of 
transparency for Zimbabwe.  
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The code is also in line with the stakeholder theory of corporate governance that was referred 
to in the previous chapter as it focuses on parties outside the shareholders and the realisation 
of their rights. 
3.2.4.8 Role of Government in Corporate Governance 
According to this chapter government plays both an administrative and coordinating role 
through its agencies at every level.339 It is the role of the government to provide an 
environment that is conducive for the private and public sector. Since the government is the 
biggest employer in the country, it is fundamental that it observes good corporate governance 
practices in government Ministries, Parastatals and State-controlled companies.340 This 
chapter mainly implores the government to respect laws and regulations and to play a 
meaningful role in instilling good values and ethics.341 This is of outmost importance in 
Zimbabwe because many have lost faith in the government itself and do not believe that 
SOEs will be run effectively.342 
This is an important chapter for the government to implement. It has been alleged that the 
state’s ownership policy which is exercised through multiple actors such as line ministries 
and a number of other government bodies over and above the board of directors is 
complex.343 Such complexity is known to be a challenge in matters of ensuring efficient 
decisions and good corporate governance.344 It is then argued that the state’s ownership 
functions and its policy making and regulatory functions arise and leave the SOEs vulnerable 
to be used to achieve short term goals at the expense of efficiency.345 
The above is not consistent with the OECD guideline on rationales for state ownership. The 
guidelines provide that the exercise of ownership rights must be clearly identified within the 
state administration.346 Such exercise of ownership would be facilitated by setting up a 
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coordinating entity or by the centralisation of the ownership function.347 According to the 
above the Zimbabwean state has not been able to establish a clear ownership policy and this 
might be one of the major causes of the problems that befall the management of SOEs. 
3.3 Conclusion 
This chapter indicates the importance of the OECD guidelines in the management of SOEs. It 
is important that when regulators or legislators are drafting legislation or codes infuse the 
different principles to enhance the productivity of SOEs. It is imperative that guidelines such 
as those on rationales for state ownership and the state’s role as owner be considered in 
Zimbabwe’s corporate governance regime. The state needs a clear ownership policy in order 
to avoid the use of SOEs for the achievement of short term goals at the expense of efficiency. 
The lack of clarity in the ownership policy can also lead to excessive state intervention in the 
operation of SOEs. This is true for Zimbabwe for SOEs are at used as an organ of the 
political parties and there is need to do away with this. 
The country needs a central ownership agency that will exercise the state’s right of 
ownership. Such a body would clarify the ownership policy and it will ensure that the policy 
is consistently implemented. It will be of great importance that the agency be held 
accountable to relevant representative bodies and have relationships with public bodies such 
as the office of the Comptroller and Auditor-General. 
The office of the Comptroller and Auditor-General needs sufficient powers to compel the 
disclosure of information when it wishes. There must be sufficient power for it to carry out 
random audits in order to stamp out corruption which has riddled the state enterprises. There 
is need for greater accountability and disclosure of the finances of SOEs. Responsible 
Ministers and boards should be held accountable for any corrupt behaviour, for it is alarming 
that with the level of state intervention in Zimbabwe line Ministers state that they were 
unaware of excessive remuneration practices when they occur. Application of the OECD 
guidelines in these instances would promote efficiency. 
The current regime clearly does not comply with the OECD guidelines, but the ZIMCODE is 
the only instrument that embodies most of the principles. There are issues that might need to 
be adequately addressed such as that of financial reporting as highlighted in the section on the 
Public Finance Management Act. The ZIMCODE however, provides for sufficient measures 
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in regards to reporting but it is not mandatory and this might be used as a means to 
circumvent its principles and recommendations. This issue is stressed on because one has to 
understand the operating atmosphere in Zimbabwe.  
Shortly after the salary gate scandal the government responded by capping salaries of 
executives to only US $6 000 a month with other circumstances considered in a move to 
restore sanity.348 It is, however alarming that months later a newly appointed senior 
management member of PSMAS who had replaced the previous CEO was earning US 
$40 000 which is four times the US $11 000 he should have been earning.349 This was being 
done while the company was still struggling to pay service providers and workers.350  
This points to a culture of good laws but no implementation of such laws. This is the 
operating atmosphere in most activities in which the government is involved. The country 
only scored 20 out of 100 for the 2013 and 2014 periods on the corruption perceptions index 
compiled by Transparency International.351 The scores reflect the level of corruption in public 
sectors and the organisation adds that “bribes and backroom deals don’t just steal resources 
from the most vulnerable- they undermine economic justice and economic development, and 
destroy public trust in government and leaders.”352 There is also a strong need to end the 
culture of ‘militarising’ SOE boards, implementation of the ZIMCODE will prevent such 
tendencies.  
It is important that the ZIMCODE is implemented because it will provide the public with 
much needed confidence in the system that has been lost over the years. It is in line with most 
of the OECD principles and it provides a good yardstick for corporate governance as it 
embodies the corporate governance definition referred to in the previous chapter. The code 
propagates a culture of transparency and accountability which is of utmost importance. There 
is however need to advocate for the insulation of the boards of SOEs to ensure that even 
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though they take instructions from the state they are free from undue political influence. As 
stated in the code some of the principles and recommendations must be made mandatory for 
SOEs with the hope that new boards will adopt a culture of implementation. 
The next chapter will undertake a comparative analysis of the corporate governance of SOEs 
in New Zealand. This will be done in order to provide an example from which valuable 
lessons can be derived for the Zimbabwean public sector. 
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CHAPTER 4 
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE GOVERNANCE IN NEW ZEALAND 
4.1 Introduction to New Zealand and its State-owned Enterprises 
The previous chapter illustrated that Zimbabwe has had numerous problems in the 
management of its SOEs. In view of this, the corporate governance structure of Zimbabwe 
was analysed and it is necessary that lessons be derived from another jurisdiction. This 
chapter will begin by providing insight into the reasons why New Zealand has been chosen 
for this study. It will also examine the history and modern day structure of SOEs in New 
Zealand as well as its corporate governance structure. The chapter will also point at other 
aspects of New Zealand’s SOE structure from which guidance can be derived for purposes of 
this study. 
4.1.2 Why New Zealand? 
New Zealand has been chosen for this study due to its membership of the OECD and its 
relatively successful SOEs.353 New Zealand joined the OECD in 1973 and has been an active 
member since then.354 Since this study has utilised the OECD Guidelines on Corporate 
Governance of State-owned Enterprises it is only fitting that a country that is part of the 
OECD be used for comparative purposes. It is also noteworthy that New Zealand has 
managed to infuse tenets of the OECD guidelines in its corporate governance structure.355 
Apart from the OECD guidelines, this country has also been chosen for its culture towards 
corruption especially in the public sector.  
As of June 2010, 17 of New Zealand’s SOEs had a combined asset value of $ 53 billion and 
revenues of over $ 13 billion.356 This level of success provides sufficient reason for the need 
to understand how this nation has managed to reach this point in the governance of its SOEs. 
One outstanding factor of New Zealand’s public sector is the low level of corruption which is 
ranked second lowest in the world according to Transparency International.357 The low levels 
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of corruption can be attributed to government openness and effectiveness.358 Low level 
corruption countries have also been known to have strong and active civic activism and social 
trust, strong transparency and accountability mechanisms in place allowing citizens to 
monitor their politicians and hold them accountable for their decisions.359 If Zimbabwe can 
emulate such standards in regards to public sector management the benefits could be 
innumerable since the country has lost a lot to corruption and cronyism.360 
For the abovementioned reasons New Zealand will provide noteworthy lessons for 
Zimbabwe. It will also be important to note that no two jurisdictions are the same and the 
same measures cannot always be readily applied from one jurisdiction to another. Caution 
will be exercised in the recommendations to be provided. The most important concern is that 
of the political climate in Zimbabwe and this paper will be cautious on this issue.  
4.1.3 History of State-owned Enterprises in New Zealand 
It is important to note that New Zealand’s public sector includes parliament, the courts, police 
and armed forces.361 These organisations together with government departments that are 
publicly funded and directly responsible to a minister are referred to as the country’s ‘core 
public service.’362 Beyond this there are other government organisations and departments that 
are funded by the government but are not directly responsible to or controlled by the 
government.363 Under this category there are crown entities, SOEs and other government 
businesses.364 Crown entities are quasi-autonomous organisations such as commissions, 
review committees and tribunals, which are established to exercise public power or advise 
Ministers outside the ambit of the central government.365 SOEs are basically large trading 
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departments within government, which are subsequently corporatised and established as state 
legal entities with a strong commercial focus.366 Other government-owned businesses are 
those outside the scope of crown entities and SOEs, but which have a significant crown 
shareholding.367 This study will, however focus only on New Zealand’s SOEs. 
Before 1984 the New Zealand government owned a large range of essential commercial 
trading activities such as coal mining, petrochemicals, banks, insurance companies and an 
airline.368 During this period there were state-run organisations with boards and an example is 
the New Zealand Railways Corporation, which had a board whose powers and functions 
could be reviewed by the responsible Minister.369 This meant that the Minister of Railways 
retained the authority to make decisions. This practice also applied to other government-
owned commercial entities, but in varying degrees.370 Government departments and 
ministries were also responsible for the delivery of social and regulatory functions.371 
In 1984 the New Zealand economy was underperforming and the treasury produced a 
comprehensive analysis of the economic situation.372 This analysis found that the 
performance of the entities owned by the government was a substantial contribution to the 
economic situation.373 Their main findings showed that the entities were poorly governed, 
consuming large amounts of capital and other resources, and producing low to negative 
returns.374 In a paper published in 1984 (Economic Management) by the treasury the main 
reasons for the failure of SOEs included: 
a) their lack of clear, non-conflicting objectives; 
b) their operating environment i.e. the special assistance they received and restraints on 
competition; 
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c) the incentives arising from existing arrangements from monitoring performance.375  
Despite the presence of government commercial structures before 1987 there was little or no 
mention of corporate governance as a field of enquiry.376 At this time there were commercial 
companies that were governed by the Companies Act of 1955 but there was little or no public 
debate about the quality of governance.377 This debate only gained momentum when there 
was a significant number of state-owned enterprises and an environment that encouraged 
performance focus.378  
Eventually the limited liability company was chosen as the most effective vehicle for the 
management of the government commercial and trading operations.379 Various government 
departments with a strong trading function were corporatised and held as SOEs or privatised 
in a move to steer them away from ministerial control and government interference.380 It was 
at this time that the government decided to treat commercial management and risk the same 
way that the private sector did.381 This also led to the deregulation of the SOE’s market as 
well as special assistance which had been provided when trading agencies were within 
government agencies.382 Progressive deregulation was in the rail and electricity sectors and 
this meant that SOEs now faced competition from private sector companies.383 More 
importantly boards were appointed from the private sector and civil servants were excluded 
and this is still the case.384 Similar to the private sector directors were also not appointed to 
represent any community interests.385 These reforms were in line with the ongoing 
international trend of aligning public sector management with that of the private sector.386 
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The treasury was very much responsible for the development of the policy that led to the 
formation of the modern day SOE. It argued that setting up enterprises as separate legal 
entities under the Companies Act 1953 would reduce the likelihood of lenders assuming an 
implicit government guarantee.387 More importantly, it argued that giving SOE boards the 
same powers as those of private sector boards would limit the scope for detailed ministerial 
intervention in the management of the enterprise.388 The Companies Act would then provide 
the legal basis for managerial autonomy.389 This is important because corporatisation results 
in insulation because company laws usually limit the rights of shareholders to directly 
manage the enterprise.390 This would be very valuable for Zimbabwe as there is need to 
insulate SOE boards from political interference. 
Initially nine SOEs were formed in 1987 under the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 (SOE 
Act) and were to be governed by the Companies Act 1953 in an attempt to emulate the 
private sector.391 One exception to this is KiwiRail which is a statutory corporation 
established by its own legislation and is a SOE under the SOE Act but is not a company 
under the Companies Act.392 The primary function of SOEs is to act as successful business 
enterprises that actually make profits.393 Some sections of the SOE Act did allow the 
government to pursue non-commercial objectives as long as they were clearly identified and 
separately paid for rather than being hidden in the total budget.394 Despite the presence of this 
clause most of New Zealand’s SOEs have acted as fully commercial enterprises, thus 
neglecting the social objectives.395  
In each SOE there are two shares, one held by the Minister of SOEs and one held by the 
Minister of Finance on behalf of the crown with the former being the executive shareholder 
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for day-to-day overview.396 During the transition period the Minister of SOEs formed two 
advisory groups in addition to the usual advice from the treasury. One was the SOE Unit, 
which reported directly to the Minister as a part of his office.397 The purpose of this Unit was 
to provide complementary and board appointment advice to the Minister in addition to that of 
the treasury which he did not want to solely depend on.398 The other was the SOE Steering 
Committee which was made up of highly skilled directors and it actively provided the 
Minister and the SOE unit with informed advice on governance and board appointment 
issues.399 
During this period there were establishment boards which had no legal standing and were 
formed to prepare the first business plans, contracts, the draft Statement of Corporate Intent 
(SCI) and the appointment of the CEO-select.400 The SCI is the document that the 
government exercises its control through.401 The statement is prepared by the board in 
consultation with the shareholding Minister and it covers issues such as the type of business 
to be engaged in, the composition of the balance sheet and how the board will set its annual 
dividend.402  
These boards assisted with the incorporation process of the SOEs. The boards were involved 
in shaping the future of the businesses and were tasked with selecting which departmental 
staff would be taken into the new business.403 The state sector also benefited from the fact 
that skilled private sector directors accepted appointments to the establishment and company 
boards.404 This is attributed as one of the major factors for the success of the commerciality 
process. It is also important to note that since appointments were made by the Minister under-
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performing directors could be reappointed to boards for political reasons.405 This is a down 
side of giving political figures the power to appoint board members. 
In the dual model of ownership the two shareholding Ministers were advised by the New 
Zealand Treasury for the Minister of Finance and the Crown Company Monitoring Advisory 
Unit (CCMAU) for the Minister of SOEs and were accountable to parliament for the 
performance of their duties.406 The Treasury primarily advised SOEs on matters of financial 
performance, economic issues and balance sheet matters and the CCMAU provided advice on 
commercial performance matters.407 Since 2009 New Zealand has moved from the dual 
ownership model to a centralised one. The old structure was replaced by the Crown 
Ownership Management Unit (COMU) which is an integral part of the treasury that brings 
together the ownership monitoring, appointments and governance functions of SOEs.408 
Present boards are composed of seven to nine directors who are appointed based on their 
business skills and experience who are accountable to the shareholding Minister.409 Most 
SOEs are subject to Ministerial direction in relation to the content of certain aspects of the 
company’s statement of corporate intent and the level of dividend payable to the Crown.410 It 
has also been stated that the SOE framework intends for Ministers to have an advisory role 
only and not interfere with the operations of SOEs.411 This will provide the necessary 
insulation from government interference that is essential for SOEs. In the case of KiwiRail, 
the two shareholding Ministers may jointly remove board members at any time entirely at 
their discretion.412 This as a result may be vesting too much power in the Ministers as it 
cannot be up to an individual member’s discretion to remove board members. It would be 
preferable if set procedures are in place that would assist and govern such dismissals and 
open them to scrutiny for appropriateness.  
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These are among the other reforms that have been implemented by New Zealand over the 
years from the inception of the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986. The SOE reforms have 
received extensive support from researchers and commentators from other countries.413 The 
reforms have been referred to as an exemplar of new public management breaking from the 
bureaucratic paradigm of public administration.414 Various foreign governments have even 
visited New Zealand to learn from its SOE sector success.415 New Zealand SOE boards 
basically run companies without political intrusion but are only expected to abide by the ‘no 
surprises’ convention in regards to major issues.416 This has enabled a well-functioning SOE 
sector that has had numerous benefits for the government and stakeholders at large.  
4.2 Overview of New Zealand’s Corporate Governance Structure 
In New Zealand SOEs are established by the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, are 
incorporated as companies and as a result are bound by the provisions of the Companies Act 
1993.417 The State-Owned Enterprises Act is also referred to as the ‘umbrella statute’ because 
it encompasses all the necessary powers to establish and transfer assets to SOEs.418 The 
Companies Act basically regulates most of the activities of private sector companies from 
how they are incorporated and managed and other issues that come along with operating in 
the private sector. In their operation as private sector companies the SOEs will also be subject 
to the corporate governance code. Corporate Governance in New Zealand: Principles and 
Guidelines compiled by the Financial Markets Authority is the corporate governance code for 
New Zealand. This section will highlight the most important aspects of the corporate 
governance framework. 
4.2.1 The State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 
The State-owned Enterprises Act which is the founding Act for all of New Zealand’s SOEs 
provides that the principal objective of every SOE shall be to operate as a successful business 
and to that to that end it must be: 
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(a) as profitable and efficient as comparable businesses that are not owned by the crown; 
and 
(b) a good employer; and  
(c) an organisation that exhibits a sense of social responsibility by having regard to the 
interests of the community in which it operates and by endeavouring to accommodate 
or encourage these when able to do so.419    
This section provides the most important provisions in the SOE sector reforms of New 
Zealand. The government departments were transformed into SOEs for the purpose of 
creating profit making enterprises that would also be good employers.420 The Act states that 
directors shall be persons who will assist the SOEs to achieve their principal objectives.421 
Directors are given the role of making all decisions in relation to the operation of the SOE in 
accordance with the statement of corporate intent and their accountability to shareholding 
Ministers is also set out.422  
The Act makes provision for the performance on non-commercial activities. When the Crown 
wishes that a SOE provide goods or services to a person, there shall be an agreement in 
regards to this and payment must be made in part or in full by the Crown.423 The shareholding 
rights of the Minister of Finance and the responsible Minister is established by this Act. It is 
provided that these Ministers may from time to time on behalf of the Crown subscribe for or 
acquire shares or equity bonds or both in companies specified in Schedule 2 of the Act.424 
Schedule 2 provides a list of 14 SOEs that include KiwiRail, Airways Corporation of New 
Zealand Limited and Animal Control Products Limited. The number of shares or equity 
bonds to be held by the shareholding Ministers must be equal.425 The Ministers are 
empowered to exercise all rights and powers attached to the shares they hold in a SOE.426  
The Act encompasses accountability measures firstly through the statement of corporate 
intent (SCI). The SCI shall be delivered by every SOE board to the shareholding Ministers 
not later than one year before the commencement of each financial year of the SOE.427 
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Section 14 delves into the array of information to be included in the SCI such as the 
objectives of the group, the nature and activities to be undertaken and the accounting 
policies.428 It further provides for the delivery of annual and half yearly reports, and financial 
statements as well as information that should be tabled before the House of Representatives 
for purposes of accountability.429 The Auditor General is appointed as the auditor of state 
enterprises and subsidiaries and state enterprises are also designated as public entities under 
the Public Audit Act 2001.430  
Section 30 of the Act provides that “notwithstanding anything in the Companies Act 1993, 
the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989 or any other enactment or rule of law, a 
company in which all the shares are applied for by Ministers may be registered under the 
Companies Act 1993...”431 
4.2.2 The Companies Act 1993 
The Companies Act 1993 is a very broad Act that addresses numerous issues in regards to 
New Zealand’s company law. Major issues addressed in the Act include director powers and 
duties, shareholder rights and liabilities and the disclosure of different types of information. 
The Act does not specifically refer to the term corporate governance but the measures it 
contains contribute to proper corporate governance. Directors are mandated to act in good 
faith and in the best interests of the company in discharging their duties.432 Directors may not 
act or agree to the company acting in a manner that contravenes the Companies Act or the 
constitution of the company.433 Such a provision would directly apply to the issue highlighted 
in the previous chapter of SOEs being forced to contribute money to the first lady’s birthday 
celebrations.434 Furthermore directors must exercise the duty of care, skill and diligence that a 
reasonable director would exercise in the same circumstances when exercising their 
powers.435 
According to the Act, if a director commits an offense or exercises their powers and duties in 
bad faith knowing that the conduct will cause serious loss to the company they will be liable 
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to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or to a fine not exceeding $ 200 000.436 In 
Zimbabwe such provisions are generally not included in the enabling Acts of SOEs such as 
the Broadcasting Services Act437 and the Air Zimbabwe Corporation Act.438 Harsh prison 
sentences and fines are a necessary deterrent for the behaviour that has plagued SOE boards 
in Zimbabwe. It has become common that board members and public officials commit 
serious offences and only walk away with a mere dismissal because of their political 
connections.439 Where a board member has consciously prejudiced a company it is essential 
that they face fitting punishment.  
The Act makes provision for the disclosure of instances of conflict of interest. It is provided 
that a director upon becoming aware of the fact that he or she is interested in a transaction or 
proposed transaction, must cause to be entered in the interests register the monetary value of 
the transaction or the nature and extent of that interest.440 In this Act failure to comply with 
the disclosure provisions will result in an offence and liability to a penalty.441 The 
remuneration and payment of any benefits to a director must be authorised by the board.442 
Shareholders are given the right to inspect company information at any time they deem 
necessary.443 The board is mandated to ensure that accounting records are present at all times 
and the records must show that the company’s accounting methods comply with generally 
accepted accounting practice.444 Some of the provisions in regards to auditing do not apply to 
public entities because of the Public Audit Act. 
4.2.3 The Public Audit Act 2001 
The purpose of the Act is to establish the office of the Controller and Auditor-General and 
reform and restate the law relating to the audit of public sector organisations.445 The Act 
implores the Auditor-General to act independently in the exercise and performance of his or 
her functions, duties and powers.446 The Auditor-General is the auditor of all public entities 
and must from time to time audit the financial statements, accounts and other information that 
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a public entity is required to have audited.447 The Auditor-General also has the power to 
examine at any time: 
(a) the extent to which a public entity is carrying out its activities effectively and 
efficiently: 
(b) the public entity’s compliance with its regulatory obligations: 
(c) any act or omission of a public entity, in order to determine whether waste has 
resulted or may have resulted or may result: 
(d) any act or omission showing or appearing to show a lack of probity or financial 
prudence by a public entity or 1 or more of its members, office holders, and 
employees.448 
The Auditor-General may enquire, either on his or her own initiative or on request into any 
matter concerning a public entity’s use of its resources.449 Any matters that arise out of the 
performance and exercise of the Auditor-General’s functions, duties and powers must be 
reported to the House of Representatives on an annual basis.450 The Auditor-General has the 
duty to publish by way of a report to the House of Representatives, the auditing standards that 
are or intended to be applied to the conduct of audits and enquiries.451  
The Act provides the Auditor-General with the power to require a public entity or any person 
to produce a document in the entity’s or person’s custody, care or control or to provide the 
Auditor-General with information or an explanation about any information.452 This measure 
in essence compels those in possession of information to produce such information to the 
Auditor-General. The previous chapter highlighted that the Zimbabwean Audit Office has 
been unable to produce audit reports because its enabling legislation does not provide for 
powers to compel ministers and government departments to comply with treasury 
instructions.453 Such a measure could cure the defect in the Zimbabwe legislation that was 
alluded to in this instance. 
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4.2.4 Financial Markets Authority Corporate Governance in New Zealand: Principles 
and Guidelines 
Corporate governance guidelines were first published in New Zealand in the form of a 
handbook by the Securities Commission in 2004. The handbook was a shortened version of a 
fuller report, Corporate Governance in New Zealand: Principles and Guidelines published in 
2004 as well.454 The report and handbook set out the nine principles that form the basis of the 
corporate governance code. The code utilises a system of principles rather than taking a 
prescriptive approach. This allows boards to explain how they comply with each principle 
rather than ‘comply or explain why not.’455 This was done to allow for flexibility in reporting 
since there are entities that may also need to comply with other corporate governance 
principles. This approach is different from that of the ZIMCODE which prescribes how its 
principles can be fulfilled. The principles of this code complement those of the OECD. The 
code is applicable to listed issuers, other issuers of securities, state-owned enterprises and 
may also include other companies.456 
4.2.4.1 Ethical Standards  
Directors are mandated to set high standards of ethical behaviour, model this behaviour and 
hold management accountable for delivering these standards throughout the organisation.457 
A code of ethics should be adopted that is a meaningful statement of its core values. It should 
set expectations for ethical decision making in regards to acting with honesty and integrity, 
proper use of an entity’s property, not participating in illegal or unethical activity, among 
other issues.458 The code of ethics should be communicated to the employees and training and 
whistleblowing procedures should be provided.459 The code provides that a code of ethics is 
not effective unless there are consequences for directors and employees who breach it.460 This 
is an important aspect that also needs to be implemented in Zimbabwe’s ethics codes for 
SOEs. 
4.2.4.2 Board Composition and Performance 
Similar to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises the 
code advocates for a board that has a balance of independence, skills, knowledge, expertise 
                                                          
454 Corporate Governance in New Zealand: Principles and Guidelines 2014 3. 
455 Corporate Governance in New Zealand: Principles and Guidelines 2014 3. 
456 Corporate Governance in New Zealand: Principles and Guidelines 2014 5. 
457 Corporate Governance in New Zealand: Principles and Guidelines 2014 8. 
458 Corporate Governance in New Zealand: Principles and Guidelines 2014 9. 
459 Corporate Governance in New Zealand: Principles and Guidelines 2014 9. 
460 Corporate Governance in New Zealand: Principles and Guidelines 2014 9. 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
and experience.461 There should be an appropriate balance of executive and non-executive 
directors and should include directors who meet the formal criteria for independent 
directors.462 Directors are mandated to act in the best interest of the company and its roles 
must be clearly set out in a formal charter that sets out responsibilities and roles of the board, 
including any formal delegations to management.463 More importantly the chairperson of a 
publicly owned entity should be independent and no director may hold the roles of board 
chairperson and chief executive unless there are extenuating circumstances.464 The process of 
appointment should be rigorous so as to give the board a range of relevant skills and 
expertise. It is also important that boards carry out self and individual assessments in order to 
enhance effectiveness.465  
4.2.4.3 Board Committees 
Board committees should be utilised where they will enhance effectiveness in key areas while 
still retaining board responsibility.466 Board committees should have clear, formal charters 
that set out their roles and delegated responsibilities.467 Audit committees should be 
composed of all non-executive directors all of whom are independent, at least one director 
who is a qualified accountant and a chairperson who is independent and not the chairperson 
of the board.468 The code encourages the appointment of different committees such as the 
remuneration committee but these should be set up according to company needs.469 
4.2.4.4 Reporting and Disclosure 
The board should demand integrity in the financial reporting and in the timeliness and 
balance of corporate disclosures.470 The financial and annual reports of all entities should in 
addition to all information required by law, include sufficient, meaningful information to 
enable investors and stakeholders to be well informed.471 Boards must maintain an effective 
system of internal controls for reliable financial reporting and accounting records.472 Entities 
should adhere to high standards of reporting and disclosure to ensure proper accountability 
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between the entity and its investors and stakeholders.473 Reporting and disclosure 
requirements are more significant for public sector entities. The continuous disclosure regime 
should be observed in order to maintain a high standard of information disclosure.474 
4.2.4.5 Remuneration 
The remuneration of directors and executives should be transparent, fair and reasonable.475 
The board should have a clear policy for setting remuneration of executives and non-
executive directors that are fair and reasonable in a competitive market for the skills, 
knowledge and expertise required.476 Publicly owned entities should publish their 
remuneration policies on their websites.477 This should be adopted in Zimbabwe since SOEs 
have been involved in numerous remuneration scandals. The issues to be considered in 
establishing remuneration are complex and can only be viewed in the context of each 
entity.478 A distinction must be drawn between the packages of executives and non-executive 
directors and for efficiency reasons it is important to tie executive director compensation to 
entity performance.479 
4.2.4.6 Risk Management 
Directors should have a sound understanding of the key risks faced by the business and they 
should regularly verify that the entity has appropriate processes that identify and manage 
potential and relevant risks.480 The board should receive and review regular reports on the 
operation of the risk management framework and internal control processes, including any 
developments in relation to key risks.481 The code encourages processes such as enterprise 
wide risk management frameworks which are useful in identifying, monitoring and managing 
risk.482 
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4.2.4.7 Auditors 
The principle provides that boards should ensure the quality and independence of the external 
audit process.483 Boards must inform themselves fully on the responsibilities of external 
auditors and be rigorous in its selection of auditors on professional merit.484 There is also 
need that the board ensures that there is no relationship between the independent auditors and 
the subject entity of the audit or any related persons and the auditor must confirm this.485 It is 
the responsibility of the audit committee to select and recommend board and shareholder 
appointment of auditors, and to oversee all aspects of their work.486 
4.2.4.8 Shareholder Relations 
The board should promote constructive relationships with shareholders that encourage them 
to engage with the entity.487 The guidelines encourage widely-held entities to have clear 
published policies for shareholder relations and to regularly review practices aiming to 
communicate the goals, strategies and performance of the entity.488 Shareholders have certain 
rights as owners and boards should take necessary steps to ensure shareholder involvement in 
issues that need their approval.489 In giving effect to this the board must ensure that 
information is more accessible to shareholders, shareholders are given sufficient time and 
detail to enable them to participate in decisions and that shareholder meetings are held in 
places that are convenient for the shareholders.490 
4.2.4.9 Stakeholder Interests   
The board should respect the interests of stakeholders taking into account the entity’s 
ownership type and its fundamental purpose.491 Boards should have clear policies for the 
entity’s relationships with significant stakeholders, bearing in mind the distinction between 
public, private and Crown ownership.492 Public sector entities report at least annually to 
inform the public of their activities and performance since stakeholder interests have a 
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particular significance in these entities.493 Advancing the interests of stakeholders such as 
employees and customers will often further the interests of an entity and its shareholders.494 
4.3 How New Zealand has infused the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of 
State-Owned Enterprises into its corporate governance structure 
A number of OECD countries have realised the need to utilise a centralised system of the 
ownership function.495 In line with the OECD guideline on the state’s role as an owner, New 
Zealand has centralised its ownership function. This has been done through centralising the 
ownership model under which ownership is now the responsibility of a specialised unit. The 
specialised unit is known as the Crown Ownership Management Unit (COMU) which is an 
integral part of the treasury.496 It is responsible for ownership monitoring, appointments and 
governance functions of SOEs.497 Under this guideline New Zealand has also managed, 
through provisions of the State-Owned Enterprises Act, to create an arms-length relationship 
between the government and SOEs by distancing management tasks from political control.498 
The above ties in with the rationales for state ownership guideline. According to this 
guideline the ownership policy should be subject to appropriate procedures for political 
accountability and should be disclosed to the public.499 There should not be multiple or 
contradictory rationales for state ownership as these can lead to either passive conduct of 
ownership functions or excessive intervention in matters or decisions which should be left to 
the enterprise and its organs.500 New Zealand’s ownership policy is clear in terms of the 
mandate of the Crown Ownership Management Unit (COMU) and is published to the public 
on the treasury’s website.  
In terms of the transparency and disclosure guideline New Zealand has made more efforts to 
enhance transparency in the management of its SOEs. In January 2010 shareholding 
Ministers initiated a continuous disclosure regime for the largest 7 SOEs.501 This was done in 
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an effort to keep the public constantly informed on matters that may have a material effect on 
each of the 7 companies’ commercial value.502 This measure is in line with the OECD 
guideline on transparency and disclosure which requires SOEs to publish all material and 
non-material information to the state as an owner and the general public.503 
Incorporating these guidelines into the corporate governance structure of New Zealand has 
enhanced the structure and ensured well governed enterprises that are profit making.504 New 
Zealand’s corporate governance structure embodies the OECD guidelines in many aspects, 
the above have been highlighted for their importance for Zimbabwe.  
4.4 Conclusion 
New Zealand realised early that its government owned entities were underperforming as a 
result of the manner in which they were owned and controlled. These entities were poorly 
governed, consumed large amounts of capital and produced low to negative returns which is 
nearly the same situation in Zimbabwe’s SOEs. In its reforms New Zealand created a 
corporate governance structure that would leave Ministers with an advisory role and SOE 
boards with the necessary independence and freedom to manage their operations. Zimbabwe 
needs to free its SOEs from heavy government intervention as this has not proved to be of 
any benefit. 
SOEs in New Zealand are insulated from most of the state’s bureaucratic tendencies by their 
incorporation under the Companies Act 1993. This allows them to operate as and compete 
with private sector companies. This transition was made more fluent by the highly skilled 
directors that were recruited from the private sector who were willing to join the boards of the 
new SOEs. Company law provided a suiting alternative to the manner in which these entities 
were previously controlled. It is worthwhile to explore the potential benefits of corporatising 
Zimbabwe’s SOEs since the country has slightly more efficient company laws. Apart from 
providing insulation from government interference this model could also change the public’s 
perception of what a SOE is and restore the faith that has been lost. This model could also be 
a solution to the bureaucratic paradigm of public administration which stifles growth that the 
country is stuck in. 
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According to Transparency International New Zealand has the second lowest level of public 
sector corruption in the world. As mentioned in the chapter this can be attributed to 
government openness and effectiveness. Other factors include civic activism, social trust 
transparency and accountability mechanisms allowing citizens to monitor politicians and hold 
them accountable for their decisions. Most of the factors mentioned here do not necessarily 
exist in Zimbabwe and where they exist they do not have a considerable effect. The 
government has made efforts to stamp out corruption but these have been in vein because it 
allowed these activities to take root for a long time that they are now engrained in most 
economic sectors. Change required in this matter goes further than the corporate governance 
structure and would lead this paper to encroach into a political debate. 
It is important to note that since New Zealand is a member of the OECD, its corporate 
governance structure mirrors most of the OECD guidelines. In its ownership role New 
Zealand created a centralised system. The Crown Ownership Management Unit assumes 
responsibility for ownership monitoring, appointments and governance functions of SOEs. 
This helps clarify the ownership policy and it ensures its consistent implementation. A 
centralised ownership policy is crucial for Zimbabwe because there is need for a clear 
ownership policy that is not complex. In following this guideline the Zimbabwean state 
should also create an arms-length relationship with SOEs by distancing management tasks 
from political control. 
The ownership policy of Zimbabwe should also be clear in terms of the mandate of the 
ownership body if it is to be established. There will be need to ensure that the public is well 
aware of the ownership policy and that it is subject to appropriate procedures for political 
accountability. This will be very important because there is a strong need to restore public 
faith in the accountability mechanisms of SOEs. 
In following the OECD guidelines New Zealand Ministers enhanced transparency in the 
management of SOEs. This was done by establishing the continuous disclosure regime for its 
7 largest SOEs. The importance of such a measure for Zimbabwe cannot be stressed enough. 
Zimbabwean SOEs do not always publish information to the public that may be material or 
non-material to the general public. This measure can be implemented in most SOEs to ensure 
that information is not being kept from the state or members of the public. 
The corporate governance structure of New Zealand is more or less the same as that of 
Zimbabwe except for one major difference which is that of New Zealand’s umbrella statute 
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that birthed its SOEs. A number of lessons can be derived from its Acts such as the Public 
Audit Act 2001 on the issue of adding provisions that compel ministers and government 
departments to provide information needed by the Comptroller and Auditor-General to 
perform audits. 
New Zealand’s corporate governance code utilises a system of principles which allows for 
flexibility and this is good in instances where companies already have a culture of 
compliance. The ZIMCODE has broader principles and recommendations which have the 
effect of prescribing how certain aspects should be followed. This is fitting for Zimbabwe 
because there is a need to provide direction. 
The next chapter will conclude this paper and provide recommendations on the problems 
highlighted in the previous chapters.   
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a conclusion and summary of the recommendations emanating from 
chapters 2 to 4. The recommendations are aligned in order to provide a unified proposal in 
regards to the weaknesses in the SOE corporate governance structure of Zimbabwe. The 
recommendations additionally take into account the lessons derived from the corporate 
governance reforms of New Zealand. The premise of this discussion is outlined in the 
previous chapters. 
5.2 Conclusion 
In order to ensure the profitability and sustainable growth of an enterprise it is important that 
robust corporate governance measures be in place. State-owned enterprises still form an 
integral part of the economies of developing nations. In the year 2014 Zimbabwe had about 
78 SOEs most of which were either operating at a loss or had become dysfunctional. The 
media and recent studies have made it clear that this has been due to poor corporate 
governance standards. In the past two years the media has gone on to unveil the level of 
corruption and maladministration in these enterprises. The exposures reached their peak when 
the ridiculous remuneration packages of board members and management of a number of 
SOEs were exposed. 
The abovementioned events form the premise of this study. This led to the need to understand 
the corporate governance atmosphere in Zimbabwe through assessing the strengths and 
weaknesses of the corporate governance regime. This assessment indicates that the corporate 
governance regime of Zimbabwe which went for a long time without a corporate governance 
code was a breeding ground for the abuses of office. The regime that has been assessed 
includes the Public Finance Management Act (Chapter 22:19) and the Corporate Governance 
and Remuneration Policy Framework for Chief Executive Officers of Parastatals, State 
Enterprises and Local Authorities 2014. 
The assessment utilised the OCED Guidelines on Corporate Governance for State-Owned 
Enterprises. These guidelines have become popular among OECD and non-OECD countries 
and have been endorsed by international organisations such as the Financial Stability Board 
and the World Bank. They provide a basis for establishing a good corporate governance 
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framework for SOEs. An assessment of Zimbabwe’s current regime indicated that it does not 
embody some of the guidelines and this renders it inadequate. There is a deficiency in 
guidelines such as those on rationales for state ownership and the state’s role as an owner. 
Non-compliance with these guidelines leads to a lack of clarity in the state’s ownership 
policy which can also lead to excessive state intervention which is the case in Zimbabwe. 
The assessment also revealed that the office of the Comptroller and Auditor-General does not 
have sufficient power to compel Ministers and government departments to comply with 
treasury instructions. The result of this is delayed submissions and at times total failure to 
submit statements needed for the audit. However the audit requirements of the Public Finance 
Management Act are not entirely inadequate. The Act has adequate measures for the 
transparent disclosure and management of the funds of the enterprises. The problem lies in 
individuals who are bent on non-compliance with the said legislation. This has been apparent 
in the actions of boards of directors that have circumvented the directions of the statute to 
benefit themselves. 
One of the major issues that have been raised in this paper is that of board insulation from 
undue influence of the state. According to the OECD guidelines boards require sufficient 
autonomy to enable them to carry out their mandate. This issue has not been particularly 
addressed in any of the legislation or codes of corporate governance in Zimbabwe. This is a 
matter of concern because a number of issues have been pointed out in the previous chapters. 
These include the use of SOE resources to fund political events and the militarisation of SOE 
boards.  
More recently, Zimbabwe published the ZIMCODE which is its first corporate governance 
code and it is applicable to the public and private sectors. The code embodies most of the 
OECD guidelines and it is quite progressive. It is still to be implemented and in this code lies 
the hope for the restoration of sanity in SOEs. The major concern is the issue of having good 
laws and no implementation of these laws in actual fact. The previous chapters indicated that 
there is a recent case of directors still not abiding by the salary cap introduced by government 
in response to the salary gate scandal. It is a troubling matter that those who still assume these 
leadership positions do not have much regard for proper corporate governance.  
The comparative analysis with New Zealand brings into light some of the preconditions for 
successful SOEs. The reforms that New Zealand implemented transformed its SOEs from 
inefficient government departments to profit making corporations. This was made possible by 
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the corporatisation of SOEs under the Companies Act 1993 and levelling them with private 
sector companies. The recruitment of highly skilled private directors and less ministerial 
interference enabled these enterprises to function properly. The country’s success can also be 
attributed to the low levels of corruption in the public sector. As indicated in the previous 
chapter, in 2014 New Zealand had the second lowest levels of corruption worldwide in the 
public sector according to Transparency International. This creates a governance environment 
that allows for efficiency and proper use of enterprise resources. 
New Zealand has incorporated most of the OECD guidelines into its corporate governance 
structure and this has enhanced its system of governance. In its incorporation of the 
guidelines it now makes use of a centralised system of ownership through the Crown 
Ownership Management Unit. The shareholding Ministers initiated a continuous disclosure 
regime for the largest 7 SOEs whereby material and non-material information is regularly 
disclosed to the government and the general public. 
A number of lessons can be derived from its Acts such as the Public Audit Act 2001 on the 
issue of adding provisions that compel ministers and government departments to provide 
information needed by the Comptroller and Auditor-General to perform audits. The corporate 
governance code of New Zealand utilises a system of principles which allows for flexibility. 
This is a good approach when dealing with enterprises that already comply with good 
corporate governance practices. The manner of the ZIMCODE of principles and extensive 
guidelines suits the needs of the public sector in Zimbabwe since there is need for proper 
guidance. 
5.3 Recommendations 
The weaknesses of Zimbabwe’s corporate governance structure have been highlighted above 
and it is important that recommendations are provided for the way forward. There is need to 
infuse the OECD guidelines and the lessons derived from New Zealand’s SOE corporate 
governance regime into the core corporate governance structure of Zimbabwe. 
5.3.1 Insulate State-Owned Enterprises from Excessive State Intervention 
State-owned enterprises need to be insulated from excessive state intervention and this paper 
suggests that SOEs should be incorporated and governed under the Companies Act (Chapter 
24:03). This is similar to the system used in New Zealand. The major advantage of this is that 
SOEs will now be treated as private sector entities which are clearly more efficient. This 
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measure needs to be supported by the recruitment of private sector directors who have vast 
skills and experience in the running of companies. Recruitment of highly skilled individuals 
will address the issue of militarisation of the boards of SOEs. As corporate entities, SOEs 
will have to face competition from other private sector companies and both will have a level 
playing field. Such insulation will also protect the entities from excessive state intervention 
since this is one of the major issues in the governance of Zimbabwean SOEs. Incorporation is 
also a means to protect SOEs from the state’s bureaucratic tendencies and align public sector 
management with private sector management. 
This measure ties in with the OECD guideline on rationales for state ownership. Under this 
the state should have clear and non-contradictory rationales for state ownership in order to 
avoid excessive intervention in matters that should be left to the enterprise and its organs. In 
light of this Zimbabwe needs to establish a clear ownership policy that does not result in 
complexity of the ownership structure. This will be solved by creating a centralised 
ownership model that has a clear mandate. In implementing this model the state will have to 
establish a central agency. This agency should be accountable to relevant representative 
bodies and should have relationships with public bodies such as the office of the Comptroller 
and Auditor-General. Similar to the Crown Ownership Management Unit of New Zealand 
this body can be responsible for ownership monitoring, appointments and governance 
functions. 
In addition, the OECD guideline on the state’s role as owner calls for governments to steer 
away from the day to day management of SOEs and allow them full operational autonomy 
and the centralised ownership entity should emphasise this issue. 
5.3.2 Enhance Transparency and Disclosure 
Zimbabwe’s transparency and disclosure mechanisms can be enhanced in order to restore 
public trust in the manner in which SOEs are managed. The continuous disclosure regime of 
New Zealand which enhances the OECD principle of transparency and disclosure can be 
adopted for all SOEs. This regime was implemented in New Zealand in order to constantly 
inform the public on issues that may have a material effect on each of the 7 largest SOEs. In 
Zimbabwe this measure can be adopted for all SOEs depending on the costs of continuous 
disclosure to each SOE. Information to be disclosed will include material and non-material 
information and it will be disclosed to the state and the general public. 
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5.3.3 Strengthen Powers of the Comptroller and Auditor-General 
The previous chapters indicated the need for the power to compel Ministers and government 
departments to disclose information that is needed for audits. The Comptroller and Auditor-
General should be given power to compel Ministers and SOEs to disclose audit information 
to avoid cases of late or non-disclosure. This aspect is linked to the OECD principle on 
transparency and disclosure which provides that information on enterprise financial and 
operating results should be published. The Public Audit Act 2001 of New Zealand provides 
the Auditor-General with the power to require a public entity or person to produce a 
document in the entity’s or person’s custody, care or control or to provide the Auditor-
General with information or an explanation about any information. Such a measure can be 
infused into the Public Finance Management Act (Chapter 22:19) of Zimbabwe to provide 
the compelling power for the Comptroller and Auditor-General. 
The success of SOEs in Zimbabwe is very important because they form an integral part of the 
economy. Good corporate governance fosters an environment that is needed to operate an 
efficient enterprise. New Zealand’s SOEs are subject to a robust corporate governance regime 
and this is arguably one of the major reasons for their success. SOEs in Zimbabwe have 
fallen prey to mismanagement and poor corporate governance practices. This has created 
serious inefficiencies and financial problems. This study makes it clear that the current 
corporate governance regime in Zimbabwe is not adequate. The measures proposed in this 
study can improve the situation in Zimbabwe’s SOEs. These measures can be implemented in 
addition to the ZIMCODE.  
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